Melbourne International Relations Review

Acknowledgment of Country

The Melbourne International Relations Review would like to acknowledge the true custodians of the land we operate on: the Wurundjeri Peoples of the Kulin Nation. We pay our deep respects to their elders, past, present, and emerging. We thank them for caring for these lands for tens and thousands of years and acknowledge that this work has been produced on their stolen lands, sovereignty to which was never ceded.

The aim of this publication is to decolonise International Relations. It is imperative that we highlight the colonial shame of the land on which this publication is developed. This is Aboriginal land — it always has been, and always will be.

Through our work, we shall endeavour to uphold this.

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Introduction

On behalf of the Editorial Team and Melbourne United Nations Society, we are thrilled to present the inaugural issue of the Melbourne International Relations Review. MIRR is The University of Melbourne's first student-run publication to focus primarily on the discipline of international relations. Accordingly, it was formed with the ambitions of creating an inclusive platform that is representative of the diverse community that is engaged with the International Relations discipline in Melbourne and beyond. MIRR is a space for critical engagement with international relations and we welcome debates and discussions on the depth of topics that we will present with each issue.

As an academic discipline, International Relations focuses on the interaction between states and the nature of the world order. One of the core themes that is prevalent in all topics within international relations is power. From the consequences of nuclear bombs on the realm of war to the supposed "End of History" with American triumph in the cold war, power, in all its manifestations, drives the discourse in international relations, with attention bestowed upon the most powerful. "[T]he strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must", noted Thucydides in 431 BCE. Despite the passing of 2400 years since then, many prominent IR scholars continue to hold this mantra true in their analysis. But what about the countries that are deemed powerless? Are they doomed to suffer at the whims of the strong? Mainstream IR scholars often lack a comprehensive analytical framework to theorize the plight of the so-called powerless.

The theme of this issue is "Decolonizing International Relations" and this was chosen to challenge such preconceived notions about the very nature of the discipline. The strength of some countries over others is no coincidence. A simple historical survey reveals the deep-rooted effects of Western colonialism on today's world order and how state power is distributed within it. As a result, the power -centric focus of international relations has inevitably resulted in an explicit West-centric bias in its analysis, theory, and practice. This is detrimental to the discipline as this bias has shaped its ontological nature, fundamentally limiting its academic scope through its West-centric focus. It is therefore imperative to decolonize international relations not only to ground it in historicity but also to expand the scope of the discipline to include deviations from the mainstream narrative. We hope that through the pieces we have highlighted in this issue, we can motivate further discussions that are

critical of the biases of the discipline and foster a community that is decoupled from such biases.

We recognize that both in our university and academia more broadly, engagement with the International Relations discipline has not seen the representation that is due. Particularly, intersectional voices from the Global South have been absent. Such representation demands attention and is important as the discipline stands to benefit from the contribution that inclusive diversity has to offer. Our Editorial Team is comprised entirely of people of colour from diverse backgrounds, and through this issue, we have attempted to be representative of the diversity of our broader community.

In this issue, we have compiled ten compelling pieces that challenge narratives that dominate discourses in international relations. From an evaluation of the nature of terrorism to questioning the role of liberalism in the legacy of colonialism, the pieces we have selected offer critical analysis on a myriad of issues. By choosing pieces from multiple disciplines, we offer multifaceted approaches in thinking about the issue of decolonizing International Relations. We hope that this issue provokes discussions about the nature of International Relations and look forward to engaging in these conversations. We welcome feedback, criticisms, and suggestions on this issue and the direction we should take in the future. Please reach out to us at: mirr.editorial@gmail.com.

The MIRR Editorial Team

Editors Notes

Anushree Gupta — Assistant MUN Director

I never understood the history of colonisation in my country. I am partly to be blamed for this. But I have also realised that the Eurocentric education system is also to be blamed. As someone who has experienced the effects of colonisation on our culture and our education, it is important we study its repercussions. I am glad my education in the humanities has allowed me to challenge the existing notion of colonisation and understand the current form of society we live in today.

This publication is a learning; for you, for me, for everyone. We have worked tirelessly to bring into existence this piece of literature, with the hope that voices of the ones who suffered and are suffering are heard.

Anushree is a second year Bachelors of Arts student reading Politics, International Studies and History. She is an avid reader, with a weird fascination with Vladimir Putin and Russian politics (she reserves the right to change this). Currently, she is engrossed in the science of trade wars and tax evasion.

Kirsten Leung — Academics Officer

As someone studying both History and International Relations, it is undeniable the role that history has played in shaping the discipline of International Relations – like much of the rest of the world, International Relations has been shaped by the past and current realities of colonialism. The constructs and underlying assumptions that are foundational to the way we approach International Relations are based on an understanding of the world that has too long privileged a certain kind of scholar, narrative, and history of the world. It is our responsibility to challenge these ways of knowing and pursue the decolonisation of both International Relations and the wider academic field..

It is my hope through the part I have played on the editorial team for MIRR, that we can amplify voices that are underrepresented and present ideas that challenge the dominant narratives of International Relations. It has been my pleasure to work with a group of truly diverse people in

creating this inaugural issue. I hope that MIRR continues to be a platform where students can share their perspectives on International Relations, and a space where we can continue the important work of decolonising our understandings of the world.

Kirsten Leung is in her final year of her B-Arts at the University of Melbourne majoring in History and Politics and International Studies. She has a particular interest in the history of decolonisation movements in South East Asia and hopes to pursue this field within further postgraduate study.

Raiyaan Mahbub — President

I am a child of colonialism. Like billions of people from the Global South, my lived experiences and personal history has inextricably been shaped by the legacy of colonialism and the trauma it continues to inflict. This legacy is one that lacks sufficient attention in academic discourses of all disciplines, but International Relations in particular. The field that studies (dare I say fetishizes?) the power of the mightiest countries lacks sufficient appreciation for how this power was accumulated and monopolized by nations so few. IR has created a West-centric image of world order, devoid of a coherent historical narrative of how the West has violently ascended to its position of power through colonialism.

We have created the Melbourne International Relations Review with hopes of challenging this status quo. MIRR is a platform through which we want to foster critical engagement within the field of IR. The theme of decolonizing international relations is at the very core of what we want to achieve. With our first issue, we have centered intersectional youth voices in an attempt to provide approaches to IR that deviate from mainstream discourses. We will continue to foster critical conversations that are lacking in international relations and hope that our readers enjoy and feel challenged by what we have to offer.

The irony of working on decolonization in stolen indigenous land is not lost on us. Recognizing indigenous sovereignty is integral to our mission and is something MIRR will continue working on.

Raiyaan moved to Melbourne with hopes of becoming a global citizen and is now in the cusp of finishing his BA studying Politics and Economics at The University of Melbourne. Disenchanted with what he has been taught, he attempts to build his own intellectual framework to understand his place in the world. Raiyaan is the President of the Melbourne UN Society and aspires to work in creating a postcolonial development strategy for the Global South.

Kira Todd — Marketing and Events Officer

International relations too often feels like a cold, detached space, where notions of ethics, justice and humanity are brushed aside. Mainstream theories often reduce global relations to games of power and self-interest, viewing developments through the lens of competition and leaving the ultimate goal of hegemony unquestioned. These normative conceptions of international relations have shaped the way states have interacted with each other for centuries, justifying innumerable atrocities - war, invasion, colonisation - or at the very least, treating them as unfortunate yet inevitable occurrences. But it does not have to be this way. When we shift our analytical focus, we arrive at a very different understanding of international relations and expand the scope of possibility for its future - both at the theoretical level and in practice.

While transforming international relations is outside the scope of MIRR, it is our hope that in giving voice to diverse perspectives and providing a space for young scholars and leaders to interrogate the norms underpinning the discipline, we can come a little closer to achieving this aim. This edition, focusing on decolonisation, hopefully inspires the imagination of a more just and inclusive international relations. It has been my pleasure to serve on the editorial team of MIRR and I hope that it continues to amplify unheard perspectives and contribute to a critical and enhanced understanding of the international system in which we all live.

Kira Todd is a final year B-Arts student at the University of Melbourne, majoring in Politics and International Studies with a minor in French. She is particularly interested in public policy and social justice issues at national and global scales, such as climate change and inequality in its many forms.

Shashwat Tripathi — General Secretary

History will not forget: the lands that were stolen, homes that were looted, families that were destroyed, children who were taken away, women who were assaulted, and dreams that perished, forever. Yet, somehow, our textbooks and reading lists fail to remember the abhorrent legacy colonisation left on our doors. Authors like Locke and Mill are celebrated for their ideas of "liberty" while their support for slavery and European supremacy is veiled. Countries like France are romanticised for their culture while those like Afghanistan viewed with horror. The reason is simple. The discourse of international relations, and the humanities and social sciences more broadly, is formulated and developed by those whose worldview bears this colonial legacy. Hence, their comprehension lacks perspective and sensitivity.

Therefore, this publication: a platform where we exhibit ideas that should inform the discipline of

International Relations with more inclusiveness, diversity, and authenticity.

It has been my absolute pleasure to serve as the member of the Editorial Team for the Melbourne International Relations Review. We have worked assiduously to bring this issue into your hands and hope that the work of our authors opens your mind to new avenues of thinking about the realm of international affairs.

Shashwat Tripathi is in his penultimate year of his Bachelor of Arts, reading Politics and International Studies at the University of Melbourne. He also serves as the Secretary of the Melbourne United Nations Society. His academic interests include international relations (with a focus on refugee and migration studies, global decolonisation, and South Asian affairs), public policy, and political economy.

Victor Sun — MUN Training Director

I must confess, I wish I had something profound to say about the study of international relations, but my energy drink-addled mind is currently not returning any particularly good or snappy results. My interest in international relations was ignited centuries ago by my history teacher (who incidentally is part of the increasingly small number of people who believe in me). In history I learned how interactions between nations have affected interactions between people and in international relations I learned the opposite, how interactions between people affect interactions between nations. The subject matter of this journal is one of the many types of interaction that can take place between nations, colonialism. Having grown up in New Zealand, I was exposed at a very young age to the role colonialism played in the nationhood narrative of New Zealand. And New Zealand is not alone, numerous nations on this planet have been on either end of the colonial relationship. As a result, we must always stay conscious of the role colonialism has played throughout history and how it continues to affect the interactions between nations today.

What you hold in your hands today dear reader is a taste of the fascinating, transformative, and often confronting work produced by talented contributors. I hope you too enjoy reading these articles as much as I did.

Victor Sun is a second year Juris Doctor student at the University of Melbourne. For reasons we do not yet fully understand, he somehow managed to complete a Bachelor of Arts majoring in Politics and History (though evidence of his graduation is rare and unverified). His interests are unfortunately rather erratic and subject to change in minutes, maybe this section will be more developed come next edition.

Contemporary Colonialism: Shifting the Framing of the Global Refugee Crisis

Lizzie Gonzales Escudero

This essay makes use of theories by Besteman, Hage and De Genova to pinpoint the ways in which colonialism is re-enacted in modern power relations, in particular to explore how it continues to shape the current 'refugee crisis'. To this end, I delve into the impact of feelings of besiegement and 'reverse colonialism' based on residual beliefs of cultural superiority. I explore the replication of South Africa's colonial Apartheid system to gain control over certain bodies and establish discriminatory hierarchisation for a global system that needs cheap labour. Furthermore, I discuss the importance of militaristic borders to safeguard the besieged colonisers and cement their power by replicating 'imperial imaginaries'. Critically, I point to the importance of considering the active role that developed countries have played in rendering life unbearable in certain places and which has then contributed to forced migration towards their shores. In essence, this essay argues that this active role may often create the conditions for the apparent 'crisis': through a process of othering and enforcing of deterrence policies that deliberately push asylum seekers towards desert, sea and mountain crossings, these nations redirect culpability to high-risk natural conditions and irresponsible smugglers.

Whether sympathetic or in opposition to the free movement of refugees and asylum seekers, media outlets and politicians often employ negative connotations to describe their situation, shining a light on the long-held conscious and unconscious divisions that permeate our society. Unlike those who wander freely as global citizens, the movements of refugees and asylum seekers are described as "flows" or "waves", positioning their bodies as an uncontrollable threat or invasion that needs to be controlled. This essay will argue that colonialism is constantly replicated within contemporary power structures through residual feelings of threat and besiegement, with the continued maintenance of a global Apartheid providing a means to re-enact colonial eras. In particular, this essay will analyse how the colonial encounter continues to play out in response to the recent 'refugee crisis'. Acts of resistance to these colonial structures will be briefly discussed, however a full analysis is beyond the

scope of this essay. For clarity, this essay will consider all migrant groups escaping war, natural disaster or conditions of extreme poverty as part of the so-called 'refugee crisis', despite legal classifications and definitions often being more restrictive.

Departing from the superficial meaning given to the category 'white', the colonial concept of 'whiteness' arose to produce a superior and civilised culture of which the colonisers were part, and which the natives never could be. The construction of modern liberal democracies in former settler colonies has been significantly underpinned by this historic racial hierarchisation that affected the formation of identities and culture (Besteman 2019). According to Stoler (2010), categorisations were devised to gain control over the colonies by differentiating those who were sufficiently white or European from those who were native, enforcing exclusion and an asymmetrical power structure to privilege a specific identity or group. In particular, 'whiteness' materialised as a dominant conception in the imagined identities of settler colonisers, by invoking a combination of economic, ethnic and religious factors to place 'civilised' European culture at the top of the hierarchy (Stümer 2019).

Today, the relationships underpinning global power structures mirror those of cultural domination through 'whiteness' that epitomised the colonial era. Desires to preserve and protect this cultural superiority can be observed in the modern resurgence of regional securitisation obsessions which echo colonial visions of maintaining a stronghold against the invading hordes of 'others' (Stümer 2019). Historically, this concept was reflected in commonly-held coloniser beliefs of feeling encircled or besieged by the 'uncivilised savages', sentiments that were typically replicated in colonial imagery of white European settlers being shackled and subjugated by black, indigenous, Asian or Arab natives (Hage 2016). In this light, Arata (1996) labelled the fear of potential domination by the peoples that the settler colonisers had once conquered a form of "reverse colonialism". The re-appearance of this concept in modern settings has been credited with shaping contemporary views within these nations; for instance, Hage (2016) associated American feelings of migrant besiegement with increased US military deployments to the Middle East in the early 2000s. The contemporary 'refugee crisis' evokes fear of this 'reverse colonialism', in turn re-igniting colonial desires to preserve Western cultural superiority (Hage 2016). For Stümer (2019), the anxieties generated by this Western racial hierarchisation have surfaced as animosity towards non-white migrants. Furthermore, as De Genova (2010) emphasises, this hierarchisation need no longer be explicit: it is disguised by political nativism which accentuates migrant differences to camouflage racism and classicism, by prioritising the 'citizen' and safeguarding 'national identity' to legitimise the treatment of migrants.

The global population is divided according to racial hierarchies and colonial labour structures that differentiate groups by their privilege and ability to move around the world (Besteman 2019). National

borders, established during colonial eras, continue to replicate colonialist structures even decades after the discontinuation of colonial rule; these borders have served not only to administer resource distribution, but also to enclose and tie colonised people to specific locations (Hage 2016). Moreover, they re-enact legacies of colonial power structures, dividing the world along national race and class lines: for some these borders are extremely difficult to cross while others experience an open, globalised world full of opportunities (Hage 2016). For Besteman (2019), this is a clear replication of South Africa's colonial Apartheid system, with this "Global Apartheid" achieving the containment and confinement of brown bodies to determined locations while also marginalising and exploiting their necessary cheap labour; most critically, the conservation of this discriminatory system is predicated upon a significant level of border militarisation.

Borders not only demarcate national sovereignties but also serve as militaristic tools to increasingly re-enact colonialist structures. In particular, contemporary walls and borders in the United States and Europe are used strategically to guard and shield the besieged colonisers, cementing their power and replicating the "imperial imaginaries" of their unlimited privilege (Stümer 2019, p. 302). For De León (2015), these borders allow sovereign states to delineate an 'exception' zone in which individuals can be dispossessed of their rights upon entry. Here refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are framed as security threats against the civilised West to justify these increasingly militarised borders (Stümer 2019). Through considerable and concerted investment, territorial boundaries have expanded into militarised zones that aim to control the movement of people from developing countries to the North: some are categorised as exploitable by the labour market, with others deemed disposable and remanded to detention centres or camps far from view (Besteman 2019). Andersson (2014) emphasises just how lucrative the industry of controlling the movement of undocumented bodies has become, with billions of dollars invested each year in global border control: Spain, for instance, drastically increased investment in maritime interception of migrants to approximately €1 billion per year between 2006 and 2009, justifying it as essential to maintain national security. Furthermore, packages such as the $5 billion 'Friendship Pact' between Italy and Libya are often provided with conditions specifically intended to strengthen Northern borders in exchange for aid for the developing partner state (Andersson 2014). Amid these high stakes, several corporations involved in global security and defence (and with significant state ownership) such as Airbus and Finmeccanica have been vocal in promoting technological advances for border control despite little evidence of their effectiveness (Andersson 2014). This promotion has, however, achieved two crucial ends: firstly, the appeasement of public racism within the North, and secondly the disciplining of undocumented bodies by hardening their paths (Besteman 2019). In particular, these expensive and disproportionate technologies are used to force the movement of undocumented migrants towards incredibly dangerous zones far from the public eye. The US-Mexico border embodies these 'Prevention Through

Deterrence' policies which deliberately push people towards treacherous desert border crossings in an attempt to deter them (De León 2015). In this way, desert, sea and mountain are used to punish migrants and concurrently redirect culpability to high-risk natural conditions and irresponsible smugglers.

Fundamentally, movements of people from the global South often arise in response to circumstances created by the North itself. Decades of Northern looting through corporate, political and military intervention, as well as disadvantageous trade agreements and forced dispossession continue to re-enact colonial power structures that render life for many in the developing world untenable (Besteman 2019; De León 2015). Instead, the asylum seeker and refugee 'crisis' is commonly perceived as the consequence of exclusively local contexts, with a failure to recognise colonial histories and the complex intertwining of past and present global inequality, imperial domination and neoliberal expansion (Bhambra 2017). Centuries of economic, cultural and political domination within settler colonies have been overlooked by the media and political discourse, with the 'crisis' presented as a novel and uniquely post-WWII issue or as a consequence of modern globalisation (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018).

As a form of domination, modern settler colonialism has contributed to the creation of two distinct human categories of belonging: those who are more than human, and those who are less than human (De Genova 2010). For Marx, wealth accumulation in developed countries has had little to do with intelligence and careful resource administration, but rather relied upon a history of conquest, violence, enslavement and dispossession (Hage 2016). Through this Marxist lens, the conquest of new places and lands is imperative for primitive accumulation, with profits sustained through securing capital from further afield and by constantly creating landless workers whose only option is to sell their labour and become the new proletariat (Wolfe 2006). This need persists in an interminable cycle, emphasising the structural nature of colonialism's preservation (Hage 2016). Harvey (2005) extends this concept to a contemporary globalised process of 'accumulation by dispossession' through which capitalist nations force new territories into trade and ventures to gain access to cheaper raw material and labour.

Capitalism has generated distinct production zones – the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery – thereby leading to a global hierarchisation of labour (Wallerstein 2004). Those within the core system (developed nations) leverage a significant advantage over those in the peripheries, exploiting their labour and material resources. This is evident in what Besteman (2019) terms the "excess populations" produced by the global North's violent implementation of capitalism in the developing world; these individuals are exploited as cheap labour (either through temporary visas or as undocumented

workers) or else deemed disposable, displaced to refugee camps or left to die in desert or sea. Andersson (2014) explains how workers prisoner to this exploitation will migrate to the global North in search of better opportunities even in clandestine ways, as they know their low-cost and unorganised labour is demanded by labour-hungry industries such as agriculture, construction, meat processing and service. Ultimately, however, the 'Global Apartheid' of Besteman (2019) depends on the active regulation of peripheral nation labour by those within the core; those who can no longer survive in their own countries must be maintained exploitable while in the developed world, either by classing their presence as 'illegal' or by tying them to employers through temporary visas.

Colonial exploitation is re-enacted through capital-seeking instruments such as trade agreements and structural adjustment programmes that further exclude and abuse the peripheral countries and contribute to the active role of the global North in the 'refugee crisis'. Following the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the tariff-free exchange of various goods was lauded with promises of economic prosperity for Mexico; however, shortly thereafter Mexico found itself overwhelmed by masses of subsidised US corn, affecting the livelihoods of millions of farmers and in turn forcing thousands to cross the border clandestinely to participate in the vast undocumented US workforce (De León 2015).

Interventions by the global North have gone far beyond economic manipulation alone; significant military intervention has contributed to chaos in the developing world and incentivised violent militaristic cultures. For instance, Nelson (2019) traces the para-militarised administration of Guatemala to persistent intervention by the US over the last half-century to protect their economic interests; in particular, the militarised state was sparked by US involvement in overthrowing Guatemala's first democratically elected president for his favouring of communist approaches over private US interests. For decades after, the US contributed aid, weapons and instruction for Guatemalan armed forces to be trained in the 'School of the Americas' strategies to combat so-called 'low intensity' conflict; yet embedded within these strategies was the development of death squads trained to kill, torture and conduct civilian 'disappearances' if required (Nelson 2019). These strategies were particularly evident during the Guatemalan massacres of the 1980s, with thousands of civilians in Rio Negro killed by the militarised government to pave the way for a hydroelectric project (Nelson 2019). Loyal army officials were rewarded with land dispossessed from civilians, accumulating further capital through extractive industry and infrastructure projects; furthermore, they were often given powerful positions in border control, thereby laying the foundations for Guatemala's future 'narcoculture' (Nelson 2019). The paramilitarisation of Guatemala through US influence created a culture in which the state held a monopoly of force over civilians, running deep within the social fabric even many years after the conflict: twenty years after signing peace agreements, transnational

corporations continue to commence extractive operations thanks to state military intervention to any community opposition (Nelson 2019). This paramilitarisation feeds into the contemporary refugee 'crisis' – the life of every person crossing the border from Guatemala to the US has been shaped by it in some way (Nelson 2019).

Formed identities within the nation-state produce a chasm between migrant and citizen through a racialised hierarchy, further entrenching colonial power structures (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018). These power structures have been maintained through certain ideologies and discourses of belonging diffused by powerful elites who determine who should be considered a citizen and who should not, fomenting policies of exclusion (Besteman 2019). In contrast to the 'natural' classification of citizen, the Global Apartheid frames refugees as the racialised 'other', dehumanised and rendered faceless, and therefore justifying the use of extraordinary measures for their domination (Ramsay 2020). Thus, the categorisation of some lives as 'worthy' and others as not is naturalised by these racialised value systems (Kennedy 1996). The walls and borders that prop up this Apartheid system further contribute to the invisibility of refugees and asylum seekers, and the structural violence inflicted upon them (Stümer 2019). This invisibility is reinforced by policies of deterrence that push migrants towards dangerous crossings over desert and sea, allowing governments to redirect culpability to nature, thereby obscuring the experiences and deaths of thousands from the public (De León 2015). In this light, the natural environment becomes a mass grave for migrants while simultaneously civilising the violence executed against them, all the while distancing the true transgressors from their acts (De León 2015).

Despite widespread media and political discourse in the global North surrounding the 'refugee crisis', over 80% of global refugees are hosted within developing, and not developed, countries; therefore, it is more likely that these nations are in fact facing a crisis of the toxic colonialist system (Hage 2016). Yet this toxic division does not go unchallenged. The power exercised by these colonial divisions is resisted each time that an undocumented body leaves its demarcated zone and crosses a border, thereby threatening the Global Apartheid's configured order (Hage 2016). Similarly, capitalist plunder is challenged each time that a community rises to resist dislodgement or dispossession by opposing projects that damage their environment, such as during the notable Guatemalan community consultations and referendums (Nelson 2019). Activists have resisted militaristic cultures by taking cases of abuse to human rights courts in Guatemala, Chile and Peru, while protests and hunger strikes organised by refugees in Australian detention centres take place even in plain sight outside hotels in Melbourne and Brisbane (Nelson 2019; Root 2009; Ryan 2020). These acts demonstrate forms of resistance against the oppressive weight of these structural forces.

In conclusion, this essay has shown that colonial structures and sentiments are re-enacted within our contemporary world through Global Apartheid structures that strategically divide the population according to racial and class hierarchies. Furthermore, it has been shown that borders and walls are used as tools not only to discipline migrants, but to appease feelings of besiegement within the global North. Ultimately, the role of the global North in generating the need for people to seek safety elsewhere in the first place cannot be forgotten.

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About the Author

Lizzie is a final year Bachelor of Arts student majoring in Politics with a minor in Development Studies. Her passion for migration was sparked when she decided to migrate to Australia from Peru almost six years ago. She undertook a study abroad subject in Migration, Public Policy and Social Integration at the London School of Economics, and has volunteered for almost two years with the Detention Advocacy team of the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre. Currently, she is a Border Rights Project intern at Al Otro Lado, a non-governmental organisation helping asylum seekers and migrants at the Mexico-U.S. border.

Decolonising Australian Diplomacy - Indigenous-International Relationships from Past to Future

Patrick Mercer

This article will be discussing the intersections of Aboriginal politics and International Relations; an intersection that, as an Aboriginal person, strikes me as a natural relationship, obscured only by the quirks of Australian history. There is a long history of international relations in this continent, spanning across a network from Tasmania to Malaysia and beyond. Despite this history and Indigenous people's role as Traditional Owners, we are still removed from the diplomatic stage, dealing more frequently with foreign corporations than foreign nations. What are the problems with this dynamic, and how could a decolonial, reconciled Australia have a greater influence both in our region and globally?

Introduction

There is a long history of international relations in this continent, spanning across a diplomatic network from Tasmania to Malaysia and beyond, obscured by the obsessive whiteness of Australian coloniality. As a result of the thorough removal of Indigenous peoples from the Australian imagination, existing in a realm of "exception" from the Settler "self", Indigenous Australians are absent from the global diplomatic stage. (Grieves 2017, pp.87-88). This article will address this absence and the problems that have arisen from an Indigenous-International relationship rooted in corporate engagement. I will also discuss the future; the Indigenous-Settler relationship is changing, the culmination of generations of tireless labour and advocacy. What will this changing relationship mean for the future of Australian diplomacy, our role as a neo-colonial capitalist society, and our place within the Asia-Pacific region?

Precolonial Context

Trade, in this continent, was less a question of profit than one of responsibility, a combination of the

moral imperative of distributing surpluses, and the Landcare obligations of maintaining ecological balance. International relations, including foreign trade, was largely dictated by predictable seasonal events, leading to regular international summits in regions of periodic abundance. From such routines firm relationships are formed, ultimately, after generations, transcending into traditional law. Within this intersection, we can see a manifestation of the entanglement of economics, politics, diplomacy, spirituality and ecologism within Indigenous epistemology.

Bruce Pascoe writes that "territorial custodians" could have easily maintained their surpluses - but instead "chose to share the resource, actively pursuing the opportunity to attract other clans for the purposes of social and cultural exchange. The resource was more than a commodity; it was civilizing glue". (Pascoe 2014, pp.197-198). Aboriginal law insisted that land was held in common, with individuals its mere custodians - individuals were responsible for territories, but only so as to ensure its use by the next generation (Pascoe 2014, p.198). This cooperative, joint interest led to a patchwork of entanglement, as Pascoe writes: "People had rights and responsibilities for a particular piece of the jigsaw… and operated that piece so that it added to, rather than detracted from, the pieces of their neighbours… the piece that a group retained responsibility for bled into Country so distant that they may never visit" (Pascoe 2014, p.199). Long before Adam Smith "birthed" economics, Indigenous groups conceptualised "economy" in terms far closer to the word's Greek roots, *oikonomos* (household), and grasped the interconnectedness of economic cause and effect.

These reciprocal relationships, governed by international law, contributed to continent-wide Songlines, road maps expressed orally via song and story rather than visually. These complex trade routes not only connected Australia in a rich tapestry of exchange but also connected Indigenous groups to the substantial intercontinental trade lanes to our north, the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian oceans (Marks 2018). These relationships connected people from archipelagos in the Antarctic ocean to the straits of Melaka (Malacca), through to imperial China, often via Makkasan seafarers (Harcourt 2019). This brought together First Nations, Makkasan, Papuan, Micronesian, Chinese, Khmer, Tamil, Malayan and Pasifika people together in peaceful, mutualistic exchange (McCarthy 1939, p.180). A logical relationship, perhaps, given geography, yet one that is at odds with the general layman's understanding of pre-colonial Australia. In Terra Nullius logic, conceiving of history beyond profit, beyond property, and beyond whiteness in Australia can become cognitively dissonant.

Contemporary Problems

Corntassel and Woons recognise that the prevailing Westphalian "framework of inter-state relations roots itself in state sovereignty" (2017, p.131). This "state-centric" political order of "discrete borders"

differs significantly from Indigenous perspectives of international relations - and not just because these "discrete borders" were usually extended by processes of warfare, looting, slavery and genocide (Corntassel & Woons 2017, p.131). This difference is stark when observing the ways "Indigenous people renew and act upon their sacred commitments and interdependencies with the natural world" (Corntassel & Woons 2017, p.131). For Indigenous people, complex relationships between humans and nature are the underpinnings of all relationships. Indigenous nations are re-establishing their international relationships among Indigenous groups globally, but Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are usually only seen on the international diplomatic stage to call attention to the human rights abuses of the Australian state. Indigenous perspective on international relations is incongruous with Australia's state sovereignty, and Indigenous people remain removed from our rightful place as advocates and executives of Country.

As a result, the bulk of the Indigenous-International relationship is being conducted by corporations; Indigenous Australia becoming a sandpit for neo-colonialists, suffering a distinct exclusion from Australia's robust legal protections of intellectual, cultural and material property. This status has made an easy target of Indigenous Australians, as our place within the state has been in decades of flux. Self-Determination efforts in the 80's and 90's briefly renegotiated Indigenous communities into a more beneficial position when dictating terms of resource and cultural extraction on their country. The 1996 Wik decision, a symptom of many disruptive policies enacted by the Howard government, left communities and foreign entities on uncertain ground (Manne 2003, p.4). At once being encouraged to build meaningful, reciprocal relationships with semi-autonomous communities, foreign corporations were also being extended a carte blanche by cynical, neo-capitalist governments with a distaste for Aboriginal self-determination. Aboriginal communities, sometimes described as "4th World" communities are enticed by foreign investment in exchange for raw resources and cultural property, with governments happy to wash their hands of the issue. The relationship between Indigenous communities and foreign entities is therefore fraught with the ongoing exploitation of Indigenous land, resources, knowledge and bodies as traditional values of reciprocity and responsibility compete with the free market prerogatives of the settler-colony.

The foreign operations most physically impactful to Aboriginal Country are resource extraction industries such as mining, logging, fishing and agriculture. Foreign companies operating in Australia are worth 21 percent of our GDP; mining is the industry with the most disproportionately high rate of foreign investment, attracting 360 billion dollars in 2019, making up 35% of all mining investment. (DFAT, 2019). Foreign mining lobbying power is formidable; with foreign companies holding 10 out of 14 positions on both the Minerals Council board and the Queensland Resources Council board (Aulby 2017, p.2).

Other industries that have a significant proportion of foreign ownership include forestry, with foreign businesses worth 5 billion dollars, electricity and gas production, worth a quarter of total IVA, and the Agriculture and fishing industry worth 1,114 million (Tang 2018). The agricultural industry, in particular, is an industry facing encroachment from foreign investment – over 52,000 hectares of Australian farmland are foreign-owned; as a result, foreign businesses own 1.9 million megalitres of Australian water, making up 12.5 per cent of total allotments.

Australia is one of the most mineral-rich places on earth, but also one of the driest – these foreign businesses have a significant impact on our land and waterways, our native flora and fauna, on our cultural sites, our health, Despite these interests, and despite being the legitimate Traditional Owners of the continent, this foreign investment often leaves community with little more than a hole in the ground, empty water tables, and deforested plains. Critically, these resource-extraction industries are deeply implicated in the exponential progress of global climate change. Whether it is skyrocketing temperatures likely to make desert communities untenable, seawater encroaching on Saltwater, Torres Strait and other island communities, or the devastation of super-bushfires on local ecosystems, the human behaviours that promote climate change are not only deeply counter-intuitive to Indigenous values, but also pose a serious threat to our connection to Country.

Another significant point of tension in the relationship lingers around cultural appropriation and the intellectual property of Indigenous groups. Long disconnected from frameworks of Intellectual Property, Indigenous knowledges, both globally and in Australia, are beginning to enjoy attention and integration into Western legal frameworks (Drahos & Frankel 2012, p.1). This is, unfortunately, an outcome of decades of activism, networking and advocacy on the part of Indigenous groups globally, rightly highlighting that the "recognition of the economic value of Indigenous knowledge" was not resulting in the remuneration of said Indigenous knowledge-holders (Drahos & Frankel 2012, p.1). Despite the arbitrary separation of land rights and IP rights in Australia, these things are intrinsically linked - "Indigenous innovation is often place-based innovation that is cosmologically linked to land and an indigenous group's relationship with that place, rather than to laboratories" (Drahos & Frankel 2012, p.2). Australia, and the world, have historically felt welcome to the exploitation of Indigenous knowledges. This usually comes at the cost of the sacred nature of such esoteric wisdom, and the intangible meaning and value placed in it by knowledge-holders.

In early September of this year, however the Australian government declared their commitment to the protection of Indigenous intellectual property, including the importation of inauthentic Aboriginal art, and, notably, entering negotiations to buy the Aboriginal flag, one of the official flags of the state, from the non-Aboriginal business WAM Clothing. For the first time, the Federal Government has

taken steps to protect genuine Indigenous art, announcing it is considering legislation that would crackdown on fake souvenirs and artwork (Henderson & Collard 2020). Government and Indigenous pressure is also mounting on resource extraction companies. Mining companies, for example, long despoilers of Country, are already beginning to think long term about their relationships with Indigenous groups near their operations, with calls for greater investment in infrastructure, equitable access to land and water, employment opportunities and education (Crawley & Sinclair 2003, p.2). Baby steps on a mature path, true, such changes in legislation and culture would bring a new precedent to how we protect the cultural and material interests of Indigenous groups.

Until we see meaningful legal expressions of Aboriginal sovereignty in this country, there cannot be any ethical resource extraction on Aboriginal land. As Indigenous sovereignty is gradually accepted in Australia and legislative protections are built for Indigenous interests, corporations working with First Nations communities will likely need to meet more stringent regulatory standards. The role for foreign governments in these changes can be mutually beneficial - as corporate responsibility is enforced here, Australia must step up to regulate the activity of Australian companies abroad, particularly in our developing region. Reciprocal engagements such as these build trust, collaboration and understanding, rare commodities in a fast-changing geopolitical landscape.

Decolonial Futures

There is significant impetus towards meaningful self-determination, reconciliation in modern Australia, notably through the Treaty, Constitutional Recognition and Voice to Parliament models. These movements are built on the labour of many generations of exceptional defenders of Country, enjoy growing mainstream support, and are evidenced by largely successful precedents from CANZUS settler colonies. In fact, Australia remains the only settler colony to not have conducted treaty-making with its Indigenous inhabitants. It is likely an inevitability that Australia will pursue one, if not multiple, of these frameworks in the future, leading to, hopefully, a significant shift in the Indigenous-Foreign relationship.

Indigenous Australians must have a meaningful and prominent role in representing this continent on the world stage, and uphold responsibilities to the many nations that exist within it. In other parts of the world, particularly in neighbouring South-East Asia, Australia is held with apprehension as a neo-colonial presence on their doorstep – direct involvement of the Australian military throughout the Cold War, for example, in neighbouring countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, has left a sour note (Storey 2020). Australia's identity as a "white" nation has been used in the past, notably in Indonesia, for political capital whenever the relationship becomes strained. Similarly, our staunch defence of

global human rights (one of our key soft-power policies) stands in direct conflict with Australia's racist reality; consequently, creates an easy rebuttal when criticising the actions of states like China (Storey 2020). Australia could position itself as a champion of decolonisation both in our region and globally. Both the so-called BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), nations emerging as regional powers, and our CANZUS cousins (Canada, New Zealand, United States) all have distinct Indigenous groups, many enjoying degrees of sovereignty and self-determination. Indigenous relationships could become significant frameworks for ongoing collaboration with these nations, as well as other regional relationships; for example, post-colonial nations in South America with whom we share interests in the management of the Antarctic. Such reciprocal, Indigenous-led posturing could significantly boost Australia's soft power while possibly providing alternative relationships of mutual gain and collaboration to negate the rising regional hegemons. This is prudent in our local Pacific region, which has seen significant investment from dubious foreign entities, often resulting in significant environmental degradation (Cannon, 2018).. Ultimately, the overwhelming desire of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities is greater involvement in the government of their communities - both at the micro-level community governance, all the way to State and Federal government. This will ultimately push Indigenous voices to prominence on an international stage - our rightful place, and in a role we are well culturally suited to.

For Indigenous people, our sovereignty is self evident irrespective of ratification from our occupiers. Our sovereignty emanates from eternal relationships with place that transcend the material. The Westphalian system, by contrast, is rooted in illegitimate colonial and capitalist policies that reveal their driving motives. "Invented political and legal constructs" govern the way we interact today, but there is little beyond decorum enforcing this (Corntassel & Woons 2017, p.135). Like all methods of human organisation, these constructs can be changed. Being more flexible in our conceptions of international relations, re-imagining international relations with embedded frameworks of Indigenous self-determination, reinvigorating treaties with the natural world and upholding international responsibilities is timely action.

We are entering an uncertain age of decolonial politics, as the global community unpacks the legacy of Western regimes of imperial exploitation. Australia can, and should, play a significant role in this labour, as should other Settler-colonies. We are also wading deep into the challenges of climate-change induced scarcity, a challenge that will be acutely felt here in Australia and in our Pacific region. Now is not the time for ideological posturing. Now is the time for unmitigated collaboration, trust and responsibility.

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About the Author

Patrick is a Wadawurrung Kulin man from Ballarat, Victoria, who grew up on Bunurong, Wiradjuri and Darug country. Patrick has a background in Ancient World Studies and Australian Indigenous Studies, and has been lucky to have worked as a tutor and mentor for Indigenous university students, and as a researcher at the University of Melbourne for the Indigenous-Settler Relations Collaboration, IndigenousX and the Centre for Mental Health at MSPGH.

Is Terrorism the Politics of the Oppressed?

Emma Bendall

How terrorism is labelled and by whom impacts the nature of terrorist violence observed in the world. This article seeks to explore the implications of the label "terrorist", and illuminate a possible causal relationship with the acts it seeks to identify. Western frameworks for understanding terror, as being normative products of hegemonic powers, are narrow in their applicability and constrict comprehensive conceptions of terror ontology. Thus, in this essay, I seek to expand upon Western terror epistemology by exploring the political grievances that often precede acts of terror, and ultimately question the utility of the label "terrorist" on acts which are often the products of historical grievances. It should be noted that this essay is not a defence of terror, but an attempt to add more political nuance to terror theory which could thus yield more fruitful strategies of violence mitigation in the international arena.

Reasons why individuals, communities and nations turn to violence to achieve their goals is highly contested. Are those who engage in terrorism always terrorists? Whose definition of terrorist is correct? Why has terrorism been chosen over other actions as a political strategy? And importantly, who decides who gets called a terrorist? I argue that communities who perceive themselves as oppressed, on a local, national or global scale, utilise violence as a measure to regain control over their socio-political realities, and in doing so subject themselves to the label of terrorists by Western hegemonic powers. By examining the militant activities of Hamas in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the Provisional Irish Republican Army of Northern Ireland, and retaliation of fundamentalist Islamic groups to the 2003 Iraq War, I seek to explore the political factors that have led groups to turn to violence, and to add greater nuance into understanding violence than what is conventionally permitted under Western conceptions of terror. The oft-repeated truism, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" illustrates the complex stage upon which terrorism exists and provokes consideration over how Western-conceived notions of terror have widely become the norm (Schmid 2004, p.387). Schmid cites historian, Bowyer Bell, and his statement "tell me what you think about terrorism, and I tell you who you are", questioning the objective definition of terrorism purported by Western hegemonic powers (2004, p.396). Terrorism, or "fourth generation warfare" (Schmid 2005, p.129)

operates outside of clear battlegrounds, without identifiable soldiers and civilians, and without discernible periods of peace and war. In focussing on the use of terrorism by non-state actors, for whom violence is their primary *modus operandi*, I seek to illuminate the implications of a Western-informed notion of 'terrorist' and demonstrate how 'terror' is often the product of complex political realities, and in itself a political tool. In doing so, I do not attempt to make an ethical judgement about the acceptability of violence as a solution in any kind of situation. Rather, this essay focuses on the contextual factors that drive groups to practice violent political tactics.

Demonstrating that terrorism can be understood as a political tool in response to social grievances and that it does not appear out of a vacuum as an objective evil, requires examination of case studies. Hamas, the militant arm of the Palestinian authorities who operate in contested territories in Israel, exemplify how terrorism can function as a political tool. Hage states: "there is no worse dispossession, no worse privation, perhaps, than that of the losers in the symbolic struggle for recognition" (2003, p.78). The ongoing struggle of Palestinians to achieve recognition from Israel and much of the western world has led to what Hage (2003, p.81) calls 'politicide' - complete decimation of a group's ability to function as a political entity in society, as capacity to effect policies is dissolved. The final outcome of politicide is the appropriately extreme phrase, *social death*. "Nothing symbolizes social death like this inability to dream a meaningful life" (Hage 2003, p.79). It is within this state that Hamas have chosen to carry out terrorist acts as a violent means, to a political end. One of the most infamous of these acts is suicide bombings. The choice of becoming a suicide bomber, Hage contends, "reveals itself for many Palestinian youth as a path of social meaningfulness and self-fulfilment in an otherwise meaningless life" (2010, p.80). In order to fully comprehend the attraction of suicide bombing to a Palestinian youth, it is key to delve into the narrative that has been constructed around the act. The physical environment of Palestinian cities is indicative of their cultural attachment to martyrdom, with streets, squares and roads often named after martyrs who have died in suicide bombings (Allen 2008, p.459). Allen (2008, p.459) notes on his travels to Palestine how normalised and celebrated the act of death in the name of religious ideology had become, evidenced by the posters of martyrs papered over city walls to the effect of a "kaleidoscope of simulacra" (2008, p.468). For Allen, Palestine embodied the paradoxical nature of martyrdom, by becoming "a nation united through death" (2008, p.465). For disaffected youth, seeing members of their community inducted into such glorious memory is a potent narrative. The power of taking control of one's fate, escaping the crippling dispossession of your reality, humanises what the West often perceives as an *inhuman* act. As Hage contends, "we all have the capacity to rush enthusiastically to our death if it means dying as a dignified human being" (2010, p.85).

Palestinian suicide bombers do not exist in a political vacuum, but instead experience "horrors, humiliations, and degradations" (Hage 2003, p.75) every day in Gaza and the West Bank. Without these wider socio-political factors, Hage (2003, p.75) argues that suicide bombings would not be the protest of choice for young Palestinians. Sahhar (2017) cites the peaceful protests in Bil'in (a Palestinian village located in the West Bank) as an example of when peaceful methods have been pursued. Yet the Western powers who urged the Palestinians to adopt more peaceful protests were "absolutely silent" in response (Sahhar 2017). To help understand why such a protest was likely to be ineffectual, Schmid offers a political trichotomy framework. For the first two elements, conventional and unconventional politics, political disaffections are expressed through lobbying and civil disobedience, respectively. When commentators called on Palestinians to pursue peaceful means of protesting (in lieu of suicide bombing), they presumed it was taking place in an unconventional political setting. Protesting is an appropriate tool when, at most, the government is acting unconventionally. Yet the high number of Palestinian deaths in the Second Intifada (Allen estimates there were 4 600 casualties between 2000 and 2008 (2008, p.453)) indicates that the political situation in Israel had exceeded unconventional politics and reached a crisis level. The power asymmetry between the Israeli state, who possess immense military arsenal and the disenfranchised Palestinians, provides ample reasoning for which suicide bombings emerges as a last-ditch effort at protest. It is upon this backdrop of desperation, the last element in the trichotomy, that suicide bombing is the most effective way to have their suffrage heard, as "violence here has no function other than to symbolize the survival of a Palestinian will" (Hage 2010, p.73). The US Department of State officially classifies Hamas as a terrorist organisation, and is the largest supplier of arms to the state of Israel (Institute for Policy Studies, 2001). The United Nations has determined that 87% of causalities in the conflict have been Palestinians killed during Israeli attacks. In disregarding the politically charged environment from which Palestinian "freedom fighters" emerge, the USA and Israel use the term 'terrorist' to construct an agenda in which state-sponsored violence is warranted, and systematically quash Palestinian stories.

To corroborate the argument that terrorist violence is used as a political tool by oppressed peoples, we examine the experience of the republican Irish community of Northern Ireland. Similar to the activities of Hamas in Palestine, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) has operated as a para-militant entity and has been labelled a terrorist organisation by the British state. Dixon (2008, p.40) echoes Hage's sentiment that terrorist violence is last-resort politics in the case of Northern Ireland, and goes as far as inferring that "military action is an extension of political action". He concludes that "therefore, the military campaign being waged by the Irish Republican Army is in effect a political campaign" (Dixon 2008, p.40). The Irish republican community have historically viewed themselves as

oppressed – he specifically cites the working-class, and those lower on the socio-economic scale, as being the most supportive the activities of the IRA (Dixon 2008, p.48). This correlation was also observed in the Israel/Palestine conflict, which supports the theory that communities who are most impoverished and marginalised see themselves as least represented in mainstream politics, and therefore are most likely to turn to radical groups (i.e., terrorists) to enact change, by force if necessary. In this light, Western frameworks for understanding terrorism as an objective, unwarranted evil, fall short in the epistemological pursuit of understanding violence.

Northern Ireland has experienced relative peace in the 21st century – unlike the ongoing unrest in Israel/Palestine. Yet both situations demonstrated at the height of their conflict the aforementioned process of politicide. To further unpack the implications of politicide and its ability to clarify the ontology of terror, it is useful to consider Giorgio Agamben's *bios* and *zoe* dichotomy (Agamben 1998). *Zoe* is our animal life, our biological state of being that is shared with all other living things. It is our most basic and fundamental state – that is, being alive. Conversely, *bios* is also a reference to life, but this time our political, societal life, and our interactions with social structures of the world that allow us to obtain more meaning from life than what is gained from simply *being alive*. It is with this understanding that we can comprehend the significance of politics to the status of being. Dubreuil and Eagle (2006, 1) argue that *bios* is everywhere, that "we live politics… in our gestures, words, experiences, feelings and attitudes". They believe that life and politics is bound to one another in a close marriage. Thus, to have one's *bios* confiscated as in the case of the oppressed Northern Irish, or the Palestinians, is to be left with your mere animal state of simply being alive. The arsenal left available to those who have no actual political means of controlling their lives, due to lack of formal recognition, is their very life itself. It is perhaps with this complex logic that deadly acts of terror can be understood. Despite the enemy possessing greater arms, and monopolizing political life, they can still have their lives taken away from them. As Hage (2003, p.66) notes, terrorists "want to demonstrate that the other side is vulnerable". Terrorist violence is a political act. A more in depth and nuanced understanding of the environment in which violence emerges as the preferred tool of political action, would work more fruitfully to combat terrorist violence than condemnation and violent retaliation, as is practiced by the Western powers.

As explored through Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland, terrorism does not occur in a political vacuum, but rather in response to "past grievances" (Dixon 2008, p.1). We have thus far observed this phenomenon in the domestic scale with Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. Yet, the same principle has been observed on an international scale, with a pertinent example being the 7/7 London suicide bombings. The London bombings are particularly notable when studying why violence is chosen, as it

was accompanied by the posthumous speech of one of the suicide bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan. The attacker claimed that the bombings were a direct retaliation to the American-led invasion of Iraq, which begun in 2003 and of which the UK formed a key member of the 'Coalition of the Willing' (Pugliese 2008, p.214). Pugliese encourages his reader to put aside their initial disgust of the attack and "venture into the most fraught and controversial of territories inscribed with the possibility that there might be, however unrecognizable, an ethics of terrorism" (2010, p.216). The bombers believed that the attack was the most effective way they could draw attention to the plight of Iraqi citizens and oppose British support of the invasion. When Khan states that "we are at war, and I am a soldier" (quoted in Pugliese 2010, p.214), he indicates that he does not see himself as a terrorist, but a solider fighting for a legitimate cause. Despite their physical distance from the actual frontlines of the war on terror, "the London bombers emerge as paramilitary agents operating within larger Western economies of violence" (2010, p.220). Utilising Pugliese's theory, terrorists would not have the prerogative to act if not condemned within wider Western frameworks. Pugliese prompts us to use this narrative framework to consider terrorists as soldiers – as Khan's testimony indicates, they certainly see themselves as so. Hamas and members of the IRA also see themselves as soldiers fighting battles, not terrorists as they are classified in Western government discourse. From their perspective, violence is a legitimate – even *ethical* – means of fighting a perceived injustice. Terrorist attacks in this sense operate as a violent political protest to political decisions of Western states - not actions committed by a nameless, faceless evil. In the case of the London bombings, the political decision at hand was Britain's choice to join the Coalition of the Willing. The blurred lines of war, one of the elements of the aforementioned 'fourth generation' (Schmid 2005, p.129) warfare, is obvious in the War on Terror. Traditional rules of war (as stated in Article 50 of the first Geneva Protocol) forbid the killing of civilians in warfare. Yet 600 000 Iraqis have been killed in the Iraq war as of 2010. Pugliese calls these "colonial death worlds generated by the West's exercise of necropolitics" (2010, p.222). In considering Schmid's claim that non-state actors often mimic the violence committed by state actors, the political motivation behind terrorism can be understood as a consequence of Western hegemonic classifications (2005, p.130).

As contended, individuals and groups may employ terrorist tactics to protest perceived political grievances. In exploring the different scholarly theories as to why an individual would turn to terror, Kundnani (2012, p.4) examines the work of Walter Laqueur, who contends that non-Islamic terrorist entities, such as the IRA, or the ultra-left Red Army, are more political (and thus have a more reasoned motivation to commit violence). Conversely, Laqueur believes that Islamic jihadism, "new terrorism", is conducted by fanatics, not people of reasoned political motivations (Kundnani 2012, p.4). Despite thirty decades separating the two, President Bush's War on Terror speech is somewhat

reminiscent of Laqueur's rhetoric. Bush and Laqueur hold in common belief that an individual does not turn to terrorism in the belief that their community is experiencing political oppression, but rather that perpetrators of terror are simply evil by nature and wish to see their "radical visions" served (Bush, 2001). Such analysis limits the scope of understanding the ontology of terror. Indeed, Bush specifically cites "murderous ideologies" (2001) as underpinning extremism without consideration of the political context in Iraq. In the years that follow Bush's speech until 2019, an estimated 201,000 Iraqi civilians have died during the US-led coalition into Iraq, whether directly in coalition attacks on in ensuing unrest. This arbitrary labelling of who and what gets to be considered a terrorist greatly limits the objective applicability of the term. Kundnani (2012, p.9) argues that there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that Islamic fundamentalism *is* the root cause of terror. Therefore, Western conceptions of terror are further problematized in the absence of a nuanced understanding of how violence comes to be preferred solution.

The empirical nature of a community, of which religion might form a significant form of identity, is not sufficient reason enough to allocate the label "terror", claims Kundnani (2012, p.15). Kundnani believes that in order to effectively study terror, consideration of politics is essential, and we must ask, "what kinds of political circumstances, combined with what kinds of political narratives (even if expressed in religious terms), are necessary for particular kinds of violence to be seen as legitimate within a given moment?" (2012, p.18). In order to illustrate that political grievances are the main reason for terrorism, in conjunction with but not because of religious ideology, we return to Northern Ireland. As with Islamic terror, religion plays a role in the Northern Irish conflict. The Irish republicans largely identify as Catholic, and the unionists, who see themselves as British, are Protestant. Yet, religion is somewhat of a veneer for the conflict – it is mainly fuelled over territorial disputes rooted in history, administration of public welfare, and other highly-charged political grievances. The same can been seen in Islamic-based terror, although it may be harder to discern due to the fear-mongering of the media over the religious ideology of Islam. The War on Terror conducted by the United States, with support from allies, has been the direct inspiration for terror attacks that has killed civilians from those states (Pugliese 2010 p.224). In the aforementioned 7/7 London attacks, bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan stated: "Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight" (quoted in Pugliese 2010, p.214). The justification of the bombers in the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed 88 Australians, follows a similar line of reasoning: "You will be killed just as you kill, and will be bombed just as you bomb" (quoted in The Age, 2002). The argument that the suicide bombers committed these abhorrent acts simply because they are evil is an inadequate

justification vis-à-vis the conviction that the acts were carried out in retaliation to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Another of the London suicide bombers, Osman Hussain, overtly stated the bombs were "motivated by anger over the Iraq war, not by religion' (Pugliese 2010, p.224). The American invasion constructs a political environment in which, from the perspective of the attackers, the bombings could be used to communicate a message. It is difficult to acknowledge causes of terror as more than religious fanaticism, for fear of suggesting sympathy with the attackers and the implication Western states in the narrative of radicalisation. Yet, "true scholarship also involves a duty to question the underlying assumptions that define the discipline", instead of selectively formulating analysis to reaffirm assumed beliefs (Kundnani 2012, p.7).

Terrorism is politics born out of fear and desperation. It is a last resort method used to draw attention to oppression – even if it is only perceived so by the community in question – which accepts the costs of death for the cause. As stated by Aly (2014), "violent extremism describes a situation in which extreme belief in a social, political or ideological cause is coupled with a belief that violence is necessary and justified as a means to further that cause". In order to prevent the horrors of terror befalling any community, the pursuit of understanding why groups choose terrorist tactics as their political medium is necessary in order to prevent terror before it can begin. Normative scholarly work, reflected in the policies of Western states, claim that religious ideology and social groups are the main factors that cause terrorist violence (Sageman 2004, 2008; Laqueur 2004; Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman 2009). The attention that religious and social elements of terrorism receive compromises our ability to understand political circumstances that lead to oppression and marginalisation. As explored through Northern Ireland, Palestine/Israel, and militant Islamic groups over the globe, political grievances are a common denominator without which acts of terrorist violence may not have occurred to the frequency that they have. Terrorism is a horrific act of violence, yet to the communities that the terrorists represent, its perceived as their last chance to mitigate suffering. The dichotomy of global terror is perhaps best explained by R.E. Rubinstein: "terrorism is just violence that you don't like" (Schmid 2004, p.397), and is not a state of being as arbitrarily assigned by Western hegemons.

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About the Author

As a student of international relations at the University of Melbourne, Emma is keenly interested in the evolving nature of the global political arena. Her passion for politics is ultimately fuelled by her belief that everyone and everything is political, as well as the never-ending pursuit for new perspectives on issues.

Invisible or Withheld? The Politics of Hijab

Mariam Nadeem Khan

This essay explores the Western fascination with the Islamic veil. In doing so, it reveals a crisis faced by liberalism when confronted with a plurality it cannot accept or mould. This crisis, I argue, is released through the legal instrument, reflected by the numerous hijab/niqab bans across the Western world.

The Islamic veil has long been an enigma to the Western world, often in damaging ways. This enigma was born out of colonial conquest and eventually came to be categorized as an inherent site of 'difference' between the Muslim subject and a rational Western one. According to postcolonial scholar Sanjay Seth, a liberal society comes to value such a difference only through the act of cataloguing it under a singular 'Same'. A failure to catalogue then, is why liberal law faces such a crisis when confronted with the veiled woman. In this essay, I apply a Foucauldian analysis of the 'body' to argue that the veil is difficult to 'reshape' and therefore remains abandoned by the project of diversity.

Seth (2001, p.66) defines liberalism as the idea of a world 'discovered' to embody certain irreducible values, such as equality and freedom. These tenets of liberalism are thought to be inherent to us as humans and can be easily instilled into those who find themselves lacking. Therefore a liberal society is established as a neutral space, operating on the basis of a Reason validated by empiricity. Here, Seth (2001: 68) identifies a paradox: the concept of Reason is derived from Western Enlightenment while claiming to be devoid of cultural impression. This forces one to examine the limits and kinds of diversity acceptable under liberalism.

Crucial to this examination is Foucault's (1979, p.81) conception of knowledge as a set of ideas determined by "established regimes of thought". When such a regime fulfils the arbitrary conditions of unanimity and scientificity, it becomes the "truth". Lastly, because naming truths is an undoubtedly human condition, we remain in a constant flux of power relations. This process of constructing knowledge accompanies the equally constant denial of alternate possibilities, or 'subjugated knowledge' (Foucault 1979, p.81). Centred in this denial is the failure of liberalism to acknowledge

radical diversity, because it is ultimately too incommensurate with its ideals of law, freedom and equality. Diversity cannot then gain the power or propensity to mould these ideals. When confronted with a form of diversity such as the veil, that (even passively) presents a challenge to these ideals - liberalism faces a crisis. A crisis that is released through the legal instrument, by banning it or criminalizing those who wear it. This is a reaction to two ruptures, first of the Muslim 'Other' who stands in opposition to Western civilization and second of the constructed, regulated, and categorized Body.

The *hijab* (headscarf) or *niqab* (face-covering) are garments some Muslim women wear as expressions of their piety and identity. Therefore, they are visual markers of religious and (often) racial distinction n that has historically defined Muslim women as exotic, barbaric and helpless (Said 1979). It is incumbent on the West then, to supply the Muslim woman with the freedom that she lacks; 'every body liberated' (Fanon 1965, p.42) from the veil becomes validation for the liberator. This position distinguishes between two types of Muslim women: those who are worth saving, and can be rehabilitated under liberalism and those who are not. Therefore her veil instils paranoia in its obscurity, not physical but symbolic - what radical and destructive thoughts is she hiding?

The banning of the veil does not just stem from 'Islamophobia', however. It raises a challenge to the power that has been invested into the body. A complete knowledge of the body was formed on the basis of power exerted over it. The medical profession, for example, was used to classify sexuality as entirely scientific (Foucault 1989 p.29). Similarly, the subject is broken down into parts that perform functions, and the face comes to perform the duty of classifying one as an active, wilful, honest agent in social relations. This is why, when taking an oath of citizenship in Canada, one must show their face and profess themselves liable to the law that will henceforth regulate their actions (Razack 2017 p.176).

There exist conditions to establish ownership over one's own body - these include institutionalized sexual pleasure, self-beautification to reflect "presentability" and exercise to maintain physical control. When these regimes of truth are challenged however, by ideas such as sexual relations outside of marriage, or an increasing stigma attached to "fat-shaming" the effects of power can retreat and emerge elsewhere with newly defined regimes of truth. Such is the 'diffuse' (Foucault 1989) nature of knowledge and power; one that forms the basis of how multiculturalism is enacted in the West. Multicultural policies in many liberal democracies grant groups 'special' rights to practice their (acceptable) cultural and religious differences.

The veil presents itself as being resistant to this negotiation, however. This may be because it is (a)

binary, or (b) perceived as a resistant act. The veil is a condition/state: it is either worn, thus acting as an ideological symbol, or not. To clarify, this does not necessitate a ubiquitous interpretation of the veil, as they vary across cultures, time and individuals. Rather, to the concreteness of the symbol it creates. In wearing a veil, you withhold a part of yourself deliberately. When the *niqab* is banned, so too is a *niqabi* (person who wears the niqab). Such an individual finds themself outside of any legal jurisdiction, as a citizen denied access to public space (Razack 2017, p.174).

The veiled woman becomes even more confounding if we examine a second layer of difference; Simone de Beauvoir's idea of woman as the 'Other'. De Beauvoir (1949) argues that in erasing the reality of sexual difference between men and women, men come to be defined as the absolute human subject and women as the Other. This false equivalence between equality and 'sameness' often necessitates an erasure of biological difference. When a woman is veiled, no less by her own choice, she acknowledges and performs her inherent sexual difference. How is this distinct from a performance of femininity that does not involve the *hijab* or *niqab?*

To answer this, I look into two cases, both connected in their relation to feminine sexuality: the Austrian ban on hijabs in elementary schools (Oltermann 2019) and beauty pageants for children in the United States. The Austrian ban on hijabs was implemented based on the idea that putting a hijab on a child is to sexualize them. In contrast, beauty pageants are viewed as a harmless, even empowering platform for children. Increasingly, makeup and adult clothing is being marketed to young girls as indispensable. The essential difference here is that the veiled woman pulls the performance of feminine sexuality inward, to a private space. When a little girl dons the *hijab*, one is forced to confront her difference, and this expression of piety is transformed into one of sexuality. Thus the power wielded by liberal law and society to so meticulously define woman as the sexualized, inferior Other is challenged.

These contradictions can be explained by the dissolution of boundaries between public and private in the Western world. Firstly, this dissolution allows a free flow of desire, for women to be accessible (in view of) and yield to the Western male gaze. Second, it necessitates total accountability to the state and to those around you; in return for protection against "harms" to humanity. It is at this level that (legal) judgement gets grounded into truth, and instead of defining an act as a crime, it is interrogated to reveal its nature. Under the veil, a Muslim woman maintains a private place, even in public - and this is harmful to the structure on which law is predicated. Consider the Canadian sexual assault case of R v NS, in which testimony from the victim was rejected on the basis of her insistence of wearing a *niqab* (Razack 2017, p.173). The Judge ruled that the niqab was unfair to society because they cannot "participate equally in justice" (Razack 2017, p.173) in such a case. To have justice then, you must give

yourself to the state, even if the penal process does not require it. The law is no longer the guarantor of "justice"; rather a product of interpretations of it.

Liberal law operates to regulate acts; some are permitted while others restricted. Here we see liberal law working in the inference of **lives** rather than **acts**. The veil cannot be admitted under the banner of diversity because it is resistant to what upholds liberalism; it cannot be moulded into an acceptable plurality without being redefined to its core.

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Is Democracy a Western Phenomenon?

Nathan Ang

Democracy has most commonly been held as a Western conception, as Western democracy or liberal democracy. This essay will begin by illustrating that the definition of democracy is both dynamic and broad. The predominantly Eurocentric theory and history of democracy's discourse has perpetuated a pervasive and almost unquestionable notion that democracy is a Western standard. However, such a categorisation has been exclusionary. Those who have practiced, lived under, or fought for democracy may not have chosen to use the Greek term of democracy. Consequently, the Eurocentric makeup of democratic theorists and historians have meant that the democratic experiences outside of the West are either unable to be recognised or excluded from the categorisation of democracy. This essay illustrates this exclusionary nature by highlighting the Confucianism experience of democracy, which has parallels to the Western liberal democratic model and may be in some respect advantageous in comparison.

This essay will critically analyse if democracy is a Western phenomenon. This essay will begin by broadly defining democracy and categorising it in the most commonly held conception of democracy, as Western democracy or liberal democracy. This essay will argue that there has been no consensus in coming to a definition for democracy. However, the discourse of democratic theory and history has been predominantly Eurocentric, thus lending credence to the notion that democracy is indeed a Western phenomenon. This myth is able to perpetuate as the Western standard of democracy has become so pervasive it has become almost unquestionable and has been held to be the truth. However, this narrative is both inaccurate and problematic. This essay will argue that the Europeanization of the term democracy makes it exclusionary in a dual manner. These two elements have historically contributed to the perpetuation of the narrative of democracy as a Western phenomenon. Firstly, those who have practiced, lived under, or fought for democracy historically may not have chosen to use the Greek term of democracy, or may not have been even aware of it. Secondly, the Eurocentric makeup of democratic theorists and historians mean that the democratic experiences outside of the West are either unable to be recognised or excluded from the categorisation of democracy. This essay will conclude by arguing that the Asiatic experience of democracy, specifically through Confucianism, has parallels to the Western liberal democratic model and may be in some respect advantageous in protecting individual rights and working towards the collective

common good.

The term 'democracy' is found to be perennially contested as a concept as the word has come to be defined differently through different periods of time as a result of social, moral or political agendas (Crick 2002, p.12). The plethora of political scientists offering a range of definitions for democracy illustrates the difficulty in which defining democracy is an "ultimately futile exercise" as scholars and academics have yet to find consensus on a single agreed definition (Isakhan 2012, pp.4-5). As Crick (2002, p.22) states: "'Democracy' may be a promiscuous and often purely rhetorical word and certainly not a single value embracing or overriding all other values in all circumstances". As democracy has become more popular, the difficulty in defining democracy has become greater as its popularity has given way to the rise of democracies that come in various shapes and sizes as every attempt at approximating democracy has never been the same (Isakhan 2012, pp.4-5). In other words, democracies between states share commonalities, but also differences that make each democracy distinct and challenging to easily define.

The term democracy finds its origins in the Greek terms of *demos*, the Greek term for 'the people', and *kratos*, the Greek term for 'rule'. Literally translated, democracy means 'rule by people'. However, the literal translation only provides a fundamental but primal conceptualization of what democracy is. Broadly speaking for the purposes of this essay, democracy is a political system allows for the expression of the will of the rank and file in reaching and executing policies that affect the group, where there are checks and balances in the distribution of power through a set of political institutions that prevent the powerful in higher positions from concentrating power in a way that intrudes on the autonomy of those below them (Boehm 2012, p.29). While a broad definition of democracy has been adopted here, democracies are not stagnant and should not be confined to a stagnant description as democracies are required to be dynamic in its abilities to meet and respond to the malleable and ever-changing needs of the people (Isakhan 2012, p.5). This can be used to suggest that the current study and understanding of democracy may be seen as a Western phenomenon today, but also has the possibility of evolving to be seen as a universal nature of humanity, or even an Eastern phenomenon. The previously set out definition of democracy also does not provide answers to other fundamental questions democracy gives rise to, such as the requisite conditions for democracy's development, the way in which democracy is measured, the conduct, institutions and practices that sustain democracy (Isakhan and Stockwell 2011, p.2). As a result, these elements will be crucial in deciphering if democracy is a Western phenomenon.

When envisioning what a democracy is generally, the contemporary political climate automatically

accepts the Western account of democracy, that is *liberal democracy*, illustrating the assumption that liberalism and democracy are inseparable elements in defining democracy (Ackerly 2005, pp.547-8; Muhlberger and Paine 1993, pp.23-4). It should be noted that on its own a democratic state is not necessarily a liberal state, and that a liberal state is not necessarily democratic either (Bobbio 2005, p.1), highlighting the various forms of democracy. Fundamental to the Western conception of democracy is the political characterization of a close partnership with liberalism, in which the Western idea of democracy assumes an autonomous rights bearing citizen (Ackerly 2005, p.548; Youngs 2015, p.8). The liberal school of thought is a doctrine of natural rights which holds that every individual without exception enjoys certain fundamental rights, such as rights to life, liberty, security and happiness that the state must not only infringe upon, but also guarantee (Bobbio 2005, pp.5-6). As such, this indicates that liberalism gives rise in particular to a conception of a state that is limited in its powers and functions.

For Pan (2003, pp.10-1), liberty means that society becomes 'slaves' to the rule of law as it enforces a rule of law that is strict and impartial. The fundamental emphasis of individual rights in liberal democracy suggests that the decisions made by democratically elected politicians for the greater good of the collective may be routinely undermined by individual freedoms. This can be used to explain why Western societies, as a result of liberal democracy, are seen as "collections of autarkic individuals not working together to advance communal interests and values" (Youngs 2015, p.22). In other words, as a result of the fundamental emphasis placed on the individual and their protection, exacerbated by elements such as capitalism and consumerism, liberal democracy has given rise to the manifestation of a society made up of individuals that principally pursues self-interests (Ackerly 2005, p.548; Vandewoude 2015, p.20). This reveals that the pursuit of self-interests afforded by individual rights is emphasised over the collective good of society in Western societies as compared to non-Western societies.

The conventional narrative of democracy has been so widely accepted that few have challenged it, so much so that it has been held by both historians and democratic theorists that the idea of democracy was formed and developed in the West and is therefore thought to be a Western phenomenon without much question (Isakhan 2012, p.8). The Eurocentric study of democratic theory illustrates the historical tendencies of scholars to give credence to the idea of an European exceptionality, of having a "special fitness for democracy" (Muhlberger and Paine 1993, p.25). This indicates that the historic discourse of democratic theory advocates that democracy is in fact a phenomenon limited to the Western world. This suggests that those that exist outside the European world do not have, and will never have, the capacity, tendency or experience for a democratic ethos to be born and to flourish. As

Goody (2006, p.248) states: "…democracy today is viewed as a universal value of which the contemporary western world is the primary custodian and the only model". However, the evidence suggests the contrary, in that that democracies have existed, evolved and flourished before and outside of the West in all other major cultural traditions such as in Africa, Arabia, Persia and Asia (Isakhan 2012, p.8; Vandewoude 2015, p.22). This can be used to explain why the Western account of democracy has been proven to be both inaccurate and problematic in the almost unquestionable assertion that democracy is a Western phenomenon.

The Greek origins of the term democracy can be used to further explain the growth in the myth of European exceptionalism, as if the term democracy itself were to have been originating from the West, it must because the West has a unique predisposition to democracy. However, as Goody (2006, p.256) indicates, the conception of democracy as a Western phenomenon is a "gross simplification" in attributing the birth of democracy to have been originated in ancient Athens. It can thus be suggested that the concept of democracy has undergone a process of Westernization in which it has become a strictly limited and Westernized concept. The Western standard of democracy narrates democracy as a unique capacity of the West, or as Isakhan and Stockwell (2011, p.9) states: "The Western cast of the standard history suggests that only the West knows democracy and that only the West can bring democracy to the rest of the world". While the alleged origins of democracy in ancient Athens may have been the West's "first great democracy" (Chou and Beausoleil 2015, p.2). A vast majority of people throughout history have practiced, lived under or fought for democracy, the only difference being that they did not use the term democracy to describe the way in which their system of government was organised (Isakhan 2012, pp.8-9). This illustrates the exclusionary nature of the term democracy as people who do not choose to use, or may not even know of, the descriptive term of democracy are excluded from the classification of a democracy despite being a democracy in function.

Exacerbating this exclusion are the scholars of democracy, where virtually every study and effort to define democracy occurs within a small group of usually and predominantly white and wealthy Anglo-American men who are typically concentrated in the largest and best recorded institutions which are located in the West (Muhlberger and Paine 1993, p.26; Isakhan 2012, p.9). As many of these scholars have a very limited and inadequate knowledge of history outside of the West, coupled with an academic training that has an Eurocentric view and analysis of history, gives rise to the issue of ignorance in democratic theory and history (Muhlberger and Paine 1993, p.26). The study of democracy, where diversity in scholars is largely absent, ultimately results in ignorance. As a consequence, scholars either dismiss or omit the democratic experiences of various groups, such as women, minorities and other non-Western groups, who have practiced, lived under or fought for

under one type or another of democracy (Muhlberger and Paine 1993, p.26; Isakhan 2012, p.9). In other words, it is difficult to recognise the democratic experiences of other groups when there is a lack of understanding as a result of inadequate local knowledge of other groups, or an inability to even identify other groups when they do not align with the Western comprehension and interpretation of history.

The legacy of Eurocentric academics in democratic theory and history is evident in the work of Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington (1993, p.298; 300) proposes that only Western culture has the suitable attributes for the development of democracy and has conversely concluded that non-Western societies are "largely inappropriate" for democracy, going as far as to suggest that there is "almost no scholarly disagreement" that other democratic systems such as Confucianism is characterized as either 'undemocratic' or 'antidemocratic'. The legacy of Western scholars on democratic discourse, such as Huntington, point towards an attitude that is "not only Euro-centric and overtly racist, they are also alarming in their historical inaccuracy" (Isakhan and Stockwell 2011, p.10). Like their Western counterparts, many Eastern scholars also presume that democracy is unique to the West and in turn alien to the East (Hui 2012, p.60). This can be used to suggest that the standardization of the Western narration of democracy has been typically difficult to resist, illustrated by its ability to exert its influence to non-Western academics. This highlights the problematic manner in which academia has approached democratic theory and history which subsequently perpetuates the impression that democracy is a Western phenomenon. This reveals that both Western and Eastern scholars have fallen foul to the conventional Westernized standard of democracy. Alternatively, it can also be suggested that like their Western counterparts, Eastern scholars may seek to promote a unique Eastern experience of democracy and foster a notion of Asiatic exceptionalism.

The roots of democracy are not foreign to Chinese culture and tradition as they can be found in ancient and imperial China (Hui 2012, p.68; Keating 2011, p.73). Originating in 1122 BC, several centuries prior to the supposed birth of democracy in ancient Athens, the Confucian concept of the 'mandate of the heaven' is an idea with "democratic content and strong contemporary relevance" (Keating 2011, p.62). This reveals that the Asiatic religious element as a rationalisation for government is comparable to a contract with God as the West's justification for government (Pan 2003, pp.22-3). Under this dictate, the ideal Chinese polity would have a political authority that is conditional on a government that would lead the people in having prosperous and happy lives and only a moral person possessed the right to rule, where power would be forfeited when the of support from the people was lost (Goody 2006, p.102; Keating 2011, p.62). Parallels can be drawn between the Confucian and Western liberal democratic model, where both models require the support of the

people to legitimise the political authority of a rulership. The religious mandate emphasising the directive of a ruler to help the people as a collective paints a picture that is in stark contrast from the conventional narrative of Asiatic despotism (Goody 2006, p.102). The requirement to gain popular support to rule implies some semblance of a consultative process combined with a long-standing Chinese tradition of discussion and deliberation of issues at the local level point towards similarities to the Western democratic model (Goody 2006, p.102; He 2012, p.434). This reveals a non-Western culture that is hospitable for democracy to develop and flourish, indicating the need to further demythologise the idea that democracy is a Western phenomenon.

The democratic norms and practices of the West are presented as "universally valid" while proponents of other values outside the West, such as 'Asian values' are perceived to be "archaic or politically dangerous" (Bell 2006, p.4). But as this essay has established, the study and approach to democratic theory and history has been Eurocentrically flawed. Pan (2003, p.6) draws a similar conclusion stating: "The mythologized definition of democracy often implies the function of a panacea – all evils in society are often implicitly traced to the lack of (representative) democracy, or the lack of enough democracy". It is therefore problematic to suggest that the liberal democratic emphasis on individual pursuits is universally valid while non-Western forms of democracy such as Confucianism that emphasizes the collective good are invalid. As such, Confucianism highlights one of the many non-Western democratic experiences that is equally as valid as liberal democracy. Like many non-Western groups who have practiced, fought for or lived under one form or another of democracy, it can be suggested the Asian experience of democracy may not have used the word democracy, or may have been excluded from the usage of the Eurocentric term.

This essay critically analysed the proposal that democracy is a Western phenomenon. This essay has argued that the conventional conception of democracy is held to be the Western notion of democracy, the liberal democratic model. The promotion of democracy as a Western phenomenon was found to be problematic and inaccurate as a narrative. The Western standard of democracy is argued to be exclusionary in nature as the term democracy has undergone a process of Europeanization. Those who have practiced, fought for, or lived under one form of democracy or another may not have chosen to use the term democracy and have been historically excluded from being categorised as democratic. Furthermore, the Eurocentric study of democracy meant resulted in an inability to recognise other non-Western democratic experiences as they did not align with the Western conception of democracy. This essay concluded by arguing that Confucianism illustrates an example of an Asiatic democratic experience that existed prior to the West's first great democracy in ancient Athens.

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Heteronormativity and the State Gaze

Cassandra Starc

The state seeks to control and mediate expressions of sexuality through policies that oppress certain groups. In the essay through two key case studies, I will integrate the ways in which the state reproduces heteronormative (and homonormative) patriarchal ideologies by accepting some sexual expressions whist marginalising others.

Heterosexual practices and identities are influenced and constructed by the state gaze. I will demonstrate this by employing Indonesia as case study, as well as ways in which the state is itself heteronormative. Although, in terms of Indonesia, the extent to which the state enforces and regulates heterosexual practices in is dependent on the region and citizenship status, creating a double standard; one for Indonesian citizens and one for tourists. In commenting on the state gaze in Indonesia, I recognise my positionality as a white Australian non-Muslim woman; therefore, my understanding of Islam is partial. In this essay I will explore notions of compulsory heterosexuality and heteronormativity, whilst situating the heterosexuality within the conservative Muslim ideology in Indonesia; the nation-state with the largest Muslim population globally (Brenner 2011, p.478). The state gaze is vital in ideologically and discursively maintaining the ideal of 'moral' heterosexuality stipulated by the conservative Islamic party within the government (post-new order) in response to an increase in overt sexuality due to recent democratisation and freedom of press. However, whilst government stipulations reinforcing normative heterosexual practice have impinged upon Indonesian citizens, 'western' tourists, particularly in Bali, have not been held to the same standards, having come to Indonesia to let go of their inhibitions. I thus argue that the state gaze, while affecting Indonesian citizens, has established double standards for heterosexual practice and identities. The concept of there being a double standard will also apply to queerness as per the state ideology.

In order to analyse heterosexual practice in relation to the state gaze, we must first define heterosexuality – sexual relations and practices specifically between two people of the opposite gender (Beasly, Brook and Holmes 2012, p.1). Moreover, heterosexuality is privileged under patriarchy and is maintained by differing discourses and ideologies that postulate it as natural – constituting heteronormativity (Wieringa 2012, p.516). Rich extends this concept by highlighting the patriarchal

nature of heterosexuality, in which reproduction of heterosexual relations for women continues men's right to 'physical, economic, and emotional access to women's bodies (Rich 1980, p.647). She furthermore explains how forms of male dominance are more overt in terms of the enforcement of heterosexuality on women, whereby such relations are presented as being innate and inevitable (Rich 1980, p.647) Therefore, in contextualising marriage, as an institutional representation of heterosexuality, we can thus analyse the role of the state in regulating and defining heterosexual relations and practices. Moreover, the state effectively perpetuates and reifies *compulsory heterosexuality* (Rich 1980, p.645) – the maintenance of inherently patriarchal values within notions of the family unit, as well as religious sentiment. Schieder (2008) combines Rich's perspective with Foucault's theory to argue that heteronormativity and compulsory heterosexuality within Foucault's *The History of Sexuality* specifies sexuality as a 'primary technology of power' (p.88). This is the way in which power manifests itself in a discursive and diffuse manner through discourse. Therefore, heteronormativity (Wieringa 2012, p.516) codifies forms of social sexualities, and sexual relations - most of which are prevalent within culture, media, and institutions, including the state (Schneider 2008, p.90).

The Indonesian state gaze has employed and interpreted conservative Islamic values to legitimatize notions of 'morality' in terms of sexuality and the family unit, which are heteronormative and patriarchal. Heterosexual practices are culturally contingent; therefore, for the purpose of this essay, I will focus on the forms of heterosexuality situated within conservative Islam of Indonesia – home to one of the largest population of Muslims (Brenner 2011, p.478). Post New regime – influenced by conservative organisations such as the Aliansi Ummat Jawa Barat [West Java Muslim Alliance (Allen 2007, p.102) – laws have been constituted, which regulate who would be considered 'immoral' as per the Quran. Laws, institutions and other apparatuses of the state actively seek to re-establish 'traditionist' values – which instil and perpetuate compliance (Litowitz 2000, p.517). The state discursively disseminates idealised norms regarding heterosexuality – in particular its 'transgressions and concerns' as the dominant discourse changes (Boellstorff 2005, p.575).

The state gaze is employed in anything that legitimises heterosexual ideals. Indonesia's conservative political Islam has gained traction (Wieringa 2015, p.27), whereby the discourse regarding gender and the family is surrounded by the notion of 'harmony' and the 'keluarga sakinah [happy, peaceful family]' - which is heteronormative and patriarchal. This idea of 'harmony' is based on a militant model of womanhood in which the ideal housewife in post-Reformasi, is docile and pious (Wieringa 2015, p.28). Biology and religion are implicated in ideals surrounding women's duties in the household as per the heterosexual matrix (Butler 1990;1990); which constitute heterosexual relations regarding the family. Such biological determinism in relation to women's roles in the family was advocated by

bureaucracy of the previous new order regime ending in 1998 (Wieringa 2015, p.28). Propagated by conservative Muslim groups and furthered by visibly conservative Islam, the conservative Islam of the state has been highly influential in espousing the heterosexual family ideology (Wieringa 2015, p.28).

Within familial ideals disseminated through the state gaze liminal masculinity has changed over time due to transient discourses regarding their own conceptualisation of heteronormativity (Hegarty 2019, 355). As mentioned previously, heterosexual practices have been codified in a heteronormative manner. However, for men in post-authoritarian Indonesia, it has led to a liminal post new-order. Although despite the transience of masculinity, hegemonic masculinity in terms of the heterosexual matrix (Butler 1990;1993) is still prevalent and inherent to the ideals of the state propagating the 'keluarga sakinah [happy, peaceful family]' (Wieringa 2015, p.27). Within this ideologically constructed 'harmonious' family unit, patriarchal 'traditional' or 'moral' ideals regarding heterosexual masculinity and femininity reinforce the sexual and non-sexual duties of women (White & Anshor 2008, p.142). The provisions considered by the public are stipulated by dominant discourse regarding such notions.

The Anti-Pornography Bill considered by the Indonesian parliament (Allen 2007, p.101) - RUU APP (2008) – is one of over 78 regionally enforced sharia law regulations, of which 45% are concerned with 'morality' regulation (Bush 2008, p.176). RUU APP (2008) follows suite, as contingent hegemonic religious ideals drive state policy and the state gaze in stipulating moral standards derived from conservative Islam (Allen 2007, p.101). The Indonesian state gaze and its traditionalist ideals were enacted in response to alleged dissemination of corrupted western ideals, especially in Bali (Sherlock 2008, p.160). The bill sought to counteract the post new-order, in the post-Suharto context, whereby tabloid publications and new media had proliferated ostensibly 'western' sentiment through overtly sexual material (Sherlock 2008, p.160). RUU APP sought to achieve morality; 'revered dignity and faithful values' - and defined pornography as a public action that is overtly obscene, sexually exploitative, or an erotic display of some form (Allen 2007, p.101). However, the breadth and subjectivity of the definition of pornoaski [porno-actions] (Sherlock 2008, p.159), allowed for the prohibition of far less overtly sexual performances, including public displays of affection (kissing and erotic dancing in public) as well as the exposure of 'certain sensual parts of the body' (Allen 2007, p.102). The latter aligned with conservative Muslim ideals of women's covered appearance and the repression of female sexuality.

Established heterosexual relations are implicated in this process of seeking to prohibit 'pornography'

under the broad definition. Ultimately, the Anti-Pornography Bill concerned itself with the public Islamic morality; however, for a holistic analysis, we must regard the private vs the public, and the blurring of such locus'. Therefore, RUU APP can be viewed through the shifting boundaries of the public versus the private or the personal (Holmes 2007, p.111), as locus' where 'Islamic Morality' is polemically debated (Brenner 2011, p.479). However, western notions regarding the binary of the public versus the private (Holmes 2007, p.110), as Islamic movements – particularly the prevalent conservative Islam – cannot be transposed to Indonesian gender politics. Muslim women's comportment through bodily rituals and dress have long been scrutinised by state policy and varied interpretations of conservative Islamic morality and 'Islamization' (Brenner 2011, p.479). The espousal and celebration of heterosexuality propagated by the Indonesian state, is derived from heteronormative values within marriage, and ideals regarding gendered dualisms.

However, despite the attempt to regulate overt sexuality, the irregularity of the laws and regulations - *perda* (Bush 2007, p.175) - in Indonesia allowed for deviations and exceptions to be made – namely in Bali. Unlike the Muslim majority of the nation-state itself, Balinese citizens predominantly practice Balinese Hinduism, which differs from that of the dominant conservative Muslim Ideology that has manifested, as mentioned previously. Thus, Bali is seen as an exemplar of 'western' influence in a context of democracy and free press (Pausacker 2009, p.121) due to its desirability as a tourist destination. In terms of liminality, the western influence and prevalence of Bali as an escape from everyday life for western tourists, has rendered a culturally different, but nonetheless heteronormative expression of heterosexuality. RUU APP and pornoaski [porno-actions] (Sherlock 2008, p.159) sought to counter the increasing influence of the west and ostensive threats to 'morality'. Bagus (1997, p.69). This aptly refers to tourists meeting and fornicating with locals as essentially short term hedonism, whereby, such relations with locals, in this case with the opposite gender, are a form of 'cultural tourism'. Thus, such heterosexual relations involve the commodification of heterosexual tourists' desires, which are concealed under the guise of an escape from monotony and norms but ends up reinforcing heteronormativity (Bagus 1997, p.69). Moreover, the fetishisation and exoticisation of the inter-racial romance is gendered, with women assuming the female passive position and men assuming the masculine active position. This is so even if western tourists feel as though they have left their day to day identity at home. Therefore, the Muslim majority state gaze propagating idealised heterosexual notions of the family, is undermined by the (mostly) western tourist gaze which drives the tourist industry in Bali (Urry & Larson 2011, p.15). The tourist gaze concerns itself with assumed tourist practices away from home, that are contrasted with the everyday experience – both of which are inherently shaped by dominant patriarchal and heteronormative discourses. Whilst conservative Muslim ideology does stipulate and celebrate heterosexuality, it would not allow for increased libidinal

desires, and overt sexuality that can occur when westerners enter an 'exotic' context as tourists.

Consequently, I argue that heterosexual practices and constructions of identity are socio-culturally contingent. The Indonesian state gaze, has for the most part proliferated heteronormative ideals through its promotion and exultation of the 'harmonious family' defined by a conservative interpretation of Islam. However, despite the context of a Muslim majority nation-state ideologically disseminating the idealised family, the influence of the state gaze, in tourist havens such as Bali, is inhibiting to its citizens, but undermined by (mostly) western tourism.

State-supported heterosexual subjectivities, as well as that which undermines the ideology of that state also pertains to queerness. Lind (2014, p.602) affirms that through the normalisation of queerness, as the state has established homonormative notions of a "good gay". This "good gay" is white, middle class and monogamous – the embodiment of homonormativity. Queer subjectivities position themselves out of the heteronormative. Although as queerness has become more normalised, we must critically analyse how the state disciplines certain enactments, whilst capitalising on others (Weber 2014, p.597). The passing of gay marriage is an example of certain expressions of queerness being accepted and desired by the state, whilst the LGBTQ* community is still marginalised. Not dissimilarly to the conservative interpretation of Islam in Indonesia, the notion of the idealised family is implicated though gay marriage - what the state deems a "legitimate" expression of queerness. Santos (2013, p.58) uses the example of Portugal to demonstrate that legalising gay (same-sex) marriage, despite it roots in LGBTQ* activism, has created homonormative and conservative ideals of what being said "good gay" means. She thus posits that for queer relationships to be accepted by the state, they must espouse heterosexual ideals in other words – "a normal gay" (Santos 2013, p.59). Therefore the state gaze through policy, seeks to constrain queerness and construct notions of morality and "goodness", though heteronormative ideologies.

Hence, as noted, the state gaze ideologically seeks to maintain oppressive patriarchal relations – heteronormatively and homonormatively. The pornoaski [porno-actions] and RUU APP, actively sought to undermine such overt sexuality, under the guise of conservatively interpreted 'morality'. Thus, the state gaze has for the most part effectively legitimised certain heterosexual practices in certain regions and among its citizens, but has not done so in tourist havens such as Bali. Moreover queerness itself is regulated by the state, through policy that seeks to legitimise some practices (marriage) all the whilst oppressing the LGBTQ* community.

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Knowledge and Power: Civics Education and Empowered Publics

James Wilkinson

Those empowered to recognise systemic injustice are better equipped to critique and dismantle it. Is Australia a society ready for a decolonised foreign policy? Can our primary and secondary education systems help us along that path?

This essay was written and researched on the land of the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin nation. They have never ceded sovereignty. Their land was stolen. I acknowledge and thank their Elders – past, present, and emerging – for their ongoing custodianship of this land, and the teachings they share.

Introduction

This essay was written and researched on the land of the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin nation. They have never ceded sovereignty. Their land was stolen. I acknowledge and thank their Elders – past, present, and emerging – for their ongoing custodianship of this land, and the teachings they share.

Australia is a settler-colonial state. Its very existence as one country, with one legal system and one tradition, is acknowledged by that very same legal system to be a part of a "skeleton of principle" formed upon a backbone of colonialism. This stance was perhaps most clearly articulated by Justice Brennan of the High Court of Australia in the eminent case Mabo and others v State of Queensland (1992) 107 ALR 1 at 18. Colonialism is in the bloodstream of our governmental institutions.

These same governmental institutions shape the nation's foreign policy. Those institutions' existence in their current state is, by their own admission, owed to an history of colonialism. In seeking to create a decolonised sphere of international relations, then, it must be necessary to decolonise the domestic institutions which give rise to international relations.

As such, this essay is a starting point in exploring the question of how we can decolonise international relations through the lens of domestic education, as a means for empowering the Australian public to

create a long-term strategy of decolonisation. Education has been identified as the focus of this essay because of its unique position in Australian society to empower citizens and residents to become active participants in an emerging discourse of decolonisation.

1. Why Civics Education? Why in Schools?

School teachers are, generally, already overworked and expected to teach beyond their expertise (STRB cited in Bubb & Earley 2004, p. 80). This has been found to apply particularly to the Australian education system (Senate Employment, Education and Training References Committee 1997, pp. 134-5; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Training 2019, pp. 13-4). The question must therefore be asked whether adding a further expectation upon teachers to incorporate a discussion of political institutions into their classes would be feasible (Senate Employment, Education and Training References Committee 1997, pp. 127-8). Nevertheless, this essay addresses and critiques the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) by way of exploring the merits of contemporary curriculum design. This process, though, is intended merely to take stock of the current state of Australian education and to suggest a way forward, not to imply any moral or professional shortcoming.

This essay, therefore, ought not to be taken as an indictment upon teachers, nor upon those responsible for organising curricula: I doubt they would be any less hesitant than I to offer up an area of coursework to be struck from curricula to "make room" for civics education, even for an end such as eventual, constructive foreign policy reform. If any policy recommendations are to arise from this essay, they are best understood as recommendations in favour of making that room, but silent on the matter of how to do so. This is a question best left for more specialised discussion. We cannot evaluate our education system as a success if it equips our future decolonising policymakers and voters at the expense of equipping our future healthcare professionals, mechanics, labourers, and teachers.

All the same, this cannot be considered grounds to dismiss the critical importance of civics education in nurturing a public who strive for (or are capable of discussing the merits of) a decolonised model of international relations. Such a public are likely to be necessary for an elected government to seek to adopt those same aims. As Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone, and Hill (2007, p. 126) put forth, the political agenda is shaped first by the identification of some set of facts as constituting a "problem", and then acknowledgement of this matter as a problem by some significant agenda-setting group, be it a public, lobby group, Member of Parliament, et cetera. In this case, that problem is the colonised nature of Australian governmental institutions and foreign policy; the group, a sufficiently large proportion of

the voting public. To place this issue of foreign policy reform onto the governmental agenda requires, at the very least, a public who knows what to ask for. That is, a public must be cultivated who are sufficiently educated to talk about the issue enough that the government's stance on it becomes a matter of electoral importance (Dunlop 2016, p. 289).

Empowering the public to identify and demand change regarding this problem through any method besides the primary and secondary education systems would be to unnecessarily restrict Australians' access to it. Mediatising the importance of reforming Australian foreign policy would very likely politicise the matter and produce a change-averse discourse (Herman & Chomsky 1988, p. 3). The discussion's presence in the academy, although already extensive, excludes citizens who do not study international relations or foreign policy at great expense and in fine detail, and rarely demonstrates its relevance to those beyond the lecture hall and the quad (Zald & Lounsbury 2010, p. 964). Artistic depictions of the matter are contingent upon artistry, effective communication, acclaim, and success to communicate in an accessible way.

All of the above options appear unsatisfactory in not only communicating the concept of decolonising Australia's foreign policy to a wide audience, but also equipping said audience with the tools to construct a position on the matter and potentially call for the adoption of decolonising policies into the government's platform. By contrast, schools are compulsory and can relay information and inculcate values in those who attend (see, for instance, Peled-Elhanan 2012, p. 16). The schoolhouse is the most effective and accessible vehicle for a discussion intended to encourage the entire voting population to shift its thinking and consider the importance of their government's international relations.

2. The State of Affairs at Home: Australian Civics Education Today

To identify precisely what it means for a model of civics education to sufficiently equip students to engage with concepts such as developing a decolonised foreign policy, it is first necessary to query what the current systems of civics education consist of. This is because, as was previously established, our current systems are not decolonised, and other methods of empowering the public to seek such a thing out are not sufficient. It is therefore helpful to identify whether (and, by implication, why) current measures for civics education are insufficient also.

The national Australian curriculum currently mandates and provides a curriculum for the study of "civics and citizenship" for students from years seven to ten (ACARA 2014). This course of study predominantly covers what the concept of the "Australian government" is. It also includes instruction

regarding some methods of implementing change in politics – predominantly voting and letter-writing. Notably, mentions of protest and public critique of governmental institutions are generally lacking, save for the concept of how "trial by media" may obstruct the judicial branch of government from carrying out its business (ACARA 2014).

The phrases "settler-colonial state" and "decolonisation" are not mentioned in the national curriculum for civics and citizenship. But are such terms necessary for the construction of a good (or, at least, sufficient) model of civics education in Australia?

The curriculum explicitly details the nature of the Australian electoral system, the role of media in politics, federalism, the trial procedure, and the passage of legislation (ACARA 2014). Clearly, these are vital facts for young Australians to learn, as they lay a foundation for them to understand, in future, the effects their voting behaviours might have, the systems of government which they can expect to encounter in their lives, and how their opinions may be influenced by media reportage on political events.

Let us go one step further, though.

In assuming that these facts form the backbone of what is required of a secondary-level civics education, the Australian curriculum's shortcomings are twofold. Firstly, the facts the ACARA civics curriculum emphasises primarily regard the latest 300 years of Australian governmental institutions. These institutions have themselves generally treated the preceding millennia of Australian governance mechanisms as "lore", not law:

> "[O]ur laws have been patronised by the state political and legal systems, and deemed mere custom, storytelling and songs to entertain […] our laws reside in a marginal space within the modern Australian state" (Watson 2015, p. 30).

Of course, a student, especially a young one, can only learn so much in the course of the school year. However, what is put on their "radar" and what is not is more than a matter of time constraints: it is a matter of priority. To teach one set of facts about governmental institutions and not another is to (inadvertently or otherwise) develop an impression of whose laws and institutions not only exist, but exist validly. Therefore, the impression given by the curriculum as it currently exists is that Australian governmental institutions came into existence at the time of colonisation, prior to which there was some vague, immemorial set of traditions which have now faded from living memory. Not only is this untrue (see, for instance, Esposito 2019), but somewhat precludes the possibility of a discussion of decolonisation, since the colonised is essentially portrayed as superseded and obsolete (or, at best,

forgotten); the colonising, total and singular. Indeed, this concept is actively reinforced by the wording of the ACARA curriculum itself: teachers are expected to educate students about how, for instance, "Australia is a secular nation and a multi-faith society with a Christian heritage" (ACARA 2014, emphasis added). The implication here is that teachers need not address Australia's heritage of Aboriginal law, nor the tensions between traditional Australian law and the English common law the nation has adopted (for instance, the incompatible English concept of property law, or the Australian notion of kinship laws). Of course, there are curriculum points which do address Australia's Aboriginal inheritance, but these are not presented equally, as statements of what Australia "is", but merely as a section of Australian society or niche topic, where Aboriginal Australians are those with "different" identities which shape their relationship to Australia's systems of governance, and whose existence requires "recognition" by the government (ACARA 2014), situating them as a kind of interloper in their own country. Ultimately, the effect this has on the curriculum is to not only present an incomplete and unbalanced set of facts, but to present them in a way that is not conducive to disrupting the understanding of Australian government it creates. That is not, therefore, conducive to a decolonised understanding of Australian governmental institutions, nor even to starting a conversation on such a topic.

The second pitfall of this conception of civics education is that it omits to holistically develop skills in students. This too goes to the end of enabling students to disrupt or question the conceptions of Australian governmental institutions that they are provided with. That is, the curriculum as it currently exists encourages only what might be referred to as "internal critique": in general, it does not encourage students to assess the merits of existing or proposed governmental policy (ACARA 2014). Instead, it encourages students to consider the ways in which policymaking is hindered by institutions such as the media. Undoubtedly, an ability to acknowledge and critique media bias is a useful skill with which to equip students. However, the Australian curriculum peddles almost exclusively in discussions of persuasion and bias within citizen or civilian institutions. There is virtually no indication that the government itself is a worthy recipient of critique, nor how to recognise when that critique might be merited. It is unlikely, therefore, that there is any impetus for teachers to develop these ideas in their own classrooms when this discussion contributes little to the existing curriculum.

Certainly, critical thinking skills are not subject-specific: to suggest that learning to critique one set of institutions like news media gets students no closer to a productive discussion of decolonising governmental institutions would be an oversimplification. Nevertheless, exclusion from curricula, as stated earlier, is not a neutral action: to omit to teach is to render more obscure, less important.

How, then, are we to proceed, if we hope to instil an appreciation for the importance of decolonised (and, in general, more robust and accountable) institutions of government?

3. The State of Affairs Abroad: Education Globally – Two Case Studies

In order to assist us in determining how best to proceed, it is illuminating to consider the state of education in a more global context. For this reason, I will now turn to the education systems in two other nations: Singapore, for what it can teach us about the necessity of policy implementation; and Canada, for its parallel history of colonisation and Indigenous marginalisation.

Singapore

Studies and writings regarding the state of Singapore's education system have not shied away from the fact that everywhere, education is something of a governmental statement of intent (Ng cited in Chua et al 2019, p. 7): the outcomes most sought after by any given educational system say something about what is valued by that society or those who govern it.

Couching a discussion of the educational system in Singapore in these terms is revealing because it speaks to the common role institutional governance plays in shaping outcomes. The Singaporean educational system is described by a number of education providers and administrators as being greatly outcome-oriented (Huang 2019, p. 213). That is, an appeal to demonstrable improvements to existing criteria of success is a most effective way to propose change in the education system. For instance, a proposed syllabus change which would directly cause improved numeracy outcomes for students is most likely to be adopted. Conversely, a discussion of the meaning and significance of decolonisation, which would only see its impacts realised on a longer timescale and do not advance the educational outcomes of students in ways that are internationally, competitively assessed, have a more difficult time finding their way onto the educational policy agenda.

However, the Singaporean education system shares a common element with Australia's which may provide a necessary "foothold" to advance the discourse of decolonisation in schools. The phrase "contribute to civil society" is present in the Australian national curriculum (ACARA 2014), and the general impression given by the curriculum is that it is designed to instil a strong sense of "Australian values" (whatever these might be). Similarly, Tan et al (2017, pp. 50-1) discuss how central patriotism and a sense of civic duty are to Singaporean teaching pedagogies. The idea that developing civically-minded citizens who seek to invest in and improve their society is amicable to (constructive) critique of not only that society's methods, but also paradigms, of government (see, for example, Merry 2009,

p. 3). It is worth noting that such an idea has previously been expounded in the Melbourne Declaration, an aspirational statement of intention on the part of Australia's various state and federal Education Ministers (MCEETYA 2008, p. 9). It is nevertheless yet to see incorporation into ACARA's syllabi, and the number of changes in administration in the intervening time suggest that the Melbourne Declaration's goals are unlikely to be reflected in current policymaking discourses.

Canada

Canada bears many cultural and political commonalities to Australia – relevantly, it is a settler-colonial state in the Anglosphere. It, too, inherits a legacy of colonial institutions (Bazinet 2019, p. 101). Also relevant is the idea that reconciliation in both contexts may be contingent largely upon awareness, learning, and understanding of the effects of the colonialism: awareness currently not consistently, actively fostered in the education environment (Bazinet 2019, p. 102; Racette & Sammel 2020, p. 96).

Usefully, these similarities speak to the possibility of incorporating similar strategies of ameliorating the countries' respective education systems with a view to decolonisation. An outcomes-oriented approach to developing good citizens likens Singapore to Australia and thereby suggests a strategy for including discourses of decolonisation in the syllabus. So too do Canadian and Australian similarities suggest a way forward. In Canada, outsourcing the development of educational materials to Indigenous groups is an effective step (Racette & Sammel 2020, p. 98): this has the dual benefit of incorporating voices which diverge from the settler-colonial regime whilst also achieving commonly sought-after educational outcomes such as improved literacy.

Regarding some Canadian experiences of Indigenising education represents an opportunity to emulate the same in Australia. It arises in concrete policy recommendations (such as greater prevalence of Aboriginal-made literacy materials which foreground their voices) and adheres to current desired educational outcomes. The question therefore arises as to what this would mean for the civics education syllabus in Australia which seeks to unsettle colonial regimes of thought. Perhaps it suggests closer attention ought to be paid to Aboriginal stories, as well as meaningful discussions of how these stories impact "ordinary" Australian life: that Aboriginal experiences need not only exist in the margins of Australian society, but in fact form part of the original and enduring Australian society; that they gave rise to the original Australian governmental institutions. This, coupled with the lessons of appeals to citizenship and patriotism taken from the Singaporean context, provide an illuminating way forward.

Conclusion

The ultimate conclusion we have arrived at, then, is that a stronger voice for Aboriginal Australians is beneficial not only for its own sake, nor merely for the educational outcomes inherent in students' exposure to a culture not their own. It is also effective in developing a "critical conscience" in students: an awareness that the institutions they learn about have not always existed, and are not monoliths above critique, reform, nor even replacement. This, coupled with an appeal to the benefits to good citizenship such reform poses by cultivating more socially conscious students allows the concept of an improved civics and citizenship syllabus to gel with existing conceptions of important educational outcomes.

Change takes time. Considered change takes even more time. However, if the youngest members of the Australian public come to be informed before they so much as register on the electoral roll, we can be confident that they will be better equipped than current generations ever could be to shape the future of an unified, considered, and strategic foreign policy. That is, a foreign policy which embraces Australia's native strengths of diversity and status to build a more just future. Although this is not an unambitious goal, considered investments in the development of young Australians are unlikely to be amiss regardless of the ultimate outcomes for Australia's international relations.

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Engraved Within: Coloniality of Power and Sikh Identity Politics in a Post-Colonial India

Rowena Sidhu

In efforts to decolonise IR, scholars have turned away from the Eurocentrism that has frequented IR discourse to consider non-Western conceptions of modernity. In doing so, these efforts have overlooked the lingering effects of coloniality within a previously colonised state, in shaping their identities and creating divides. This essay aims to discuss the role colonialism played in fostering Sikh nationalism in India, which precipitated their quest for the creation of a separate state (Khalistan). This essay will first provide a brief history of the Sikh religion, before turning to assess the British colonial power's hand in triggering Sikh ethnic nationalism and their increased mobilisation into the Khalistan movement in a post- colonial India.

The impact of British colonial rule in India was far-reaching that even decades after independence, the Muslims, Hindus and the Sikhs, continue to see themselves as the British saw them. Decolonising IR is paramount in today's society as modernity has opened up spaces to new problems, including but not limited to climate change, global pandemics and financial crises, which cannot rely on traditional concepts to be solved. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012, p.8) notes that although neo-liberalism has garnered support over the years, it will be unsuccessful in transforming Euro-American hegemonic epistemology within previously colonised societies. Taking this into consideration, this essay outlines the role of British colonial rule in India as a catalyst of shaping a sense of Sikh ethnic nationalism , resulting in the creation of the Khalistan movement, which, essentially was a quest to achieve a sovereign Sikh nation.

Modernity and coloniality can be perceived as a single process within the modern global order. This is achieved through the colonial matrix of power, stipulated by Anibal Quijano, a Peruvian sociologist who identifies this process as a conquest articulating race and labour, space and peoples, according to the needs of capital and to the benefit of white European colonisers (Bhogal 2015, p.246).The end of colonialism only marks the beginning of the coloniality of power matrix. As a result, identity formation among societies within that state are heavily influenced by their colonisers, arguably even

decades after decolonisation, causing rifts within them and resulting in the birth of separatist movements. A much-debated question revolves around the factors leading to the emergence of the Khalistan movement, where some argue that it was the nature of the Indian administration towards the Sikh community in India to be the primary factor leading to a surge in support for the Khalistan movement. Others point out sentiments of Sikh nationalism were planted by the British colonial powers, with prior research focusing on the colonial period's influence in sparking Sikh identity politics as opposed to its role in the creation of separatist movements (Goulbourne 1991, p.88).

Before addressing the role played by the colonial British in instilling Sikh nationalism in Punjab, it is crucial to first discuss the birth of the Sikh religion. Gayer (2002, p.233) traces the establishment of the Sikh religion and community back to 1699 by Guru Gobind Singh. Taking the name of Khalsa Panth (path of the pure), members of this community were required to undergo an initiation (amrit sanskar) and respect a precise dress code of the 5 Ks; kesh (uncut hair), kara (steel bracelet), kanga (wooden comb), Kacha (cotton underwear) and Kirpan (steel sword) (Gayer 2002, p.233). Despite recognizing the Guru Granth Sahib (holy book) as the ultimate authority, Sikhs had not yet formed a strong sense of nationalism. Fluid, flexible and indeterminate were the most commonly used words when considering the Sikh religious boundaries in the early nineteenth century (Singh & Shani 2015, p.273). The idea of a Sikh state consequently arose in the mid 20th century as Sikhism experienced an evolution as a result of colonialism (Fair 2005 p.132; Gayer 2002, p.234). Prior to this, Sikhs did not have a concrete sense of nationalism and it was their British colonial encounters that carved out the features of modern Sikh identity (Singh & Shani 2015, p.274; Oberoi 1987; p.38). This sense of ethnic-nationalism came as a response to the British 'divide and rule' administrative policies that were first implemented in the Indian army. This commission was considered the best way to prevent a community of feeling throughout the native army (Stewart 1951, pp.49-57). The British noticed the effectiveness of this policy and consequently synthesized it into the Indian community with the principal purposes of creating new communities and re-enforcing pre-existing ones (Christopher 1988, p.234).

With this policy in place, members of the Sikh community were provided with the spaces and opportunities to form their own identity, separating themselves from the Hindu majority of the population. As Sikh nationalism grew, the separatist movement, Khalistan emerged as well. Beginning first with the focus of preserving the Punjabi language in India, this movement gained momentum in the 1960s through to the 1980s as a result of the Green Revolution (1961-1972), which forced Sikh farmers into 'pauperhood', and left them unable to reap the benefits of the land, the President's Rule in 1983. This was introduced in response to the vicious attack conducted by Khalistan extremists in Punjab, who hijacked a bus at night in Dilwan and gunned down 8 Hindu passengers and finally, the

attack on the Golden Temple (code-named Operation Bluestar) in 1984 (Fair 2005, p.128; Randhawa 1977, p.657; Jetly 2008; p.66; Arora 1990, p.207; Deol 2014, p.205). With the President's Rule in place and Sant Jarnail Bhindranwale, a key figure in advocating for the movement, taking refuge inside the Golden Temple, a raid, codenamed Operation Blue Star, sanctioned by Indira Gandhi, was conducted by the Indian Army, Border Security Forces and paramilitary and police organizations (Fair 2005; p.128). On June 4 1984, 2,000 army troops moved in to arrest Bhindranwale and his followers. The military dispersed the crowds and launched a full-scale attack on the Temple upon Indira Gandhi's authorization. During this siege, an estimated 5,000 civilians, including Bhindranwale and 700 officers were killed. Telford (2001) articulates that the army did not have the military capacity or the intelligence necessary to perform the operation. It deployed regular troops for the operation, and it initiated the attack with mortar fire in the middle of a crowded city (Telford 2001). The Golden Temple, furthermore, was heavily damaged, devastating the entire Sikh community.

It is a fair observation then that the colonial period played a vital role in fostering Sikh identity, as their divide and rule strategy segregated Indian society into religious-based identity groups, which further precipitated the Sikh nationalism in a post-colonial India. Making sense and navigating through notions of identity has always been a difficult exercise in conceptualisation. Fong and Chuang (2004, p.53) justify this point, reasoning that identities are continuously renegotiated in attempts to assimilate into host cultures and norms. However, in examining the construction of Sikh identity in India, the immediate reference to colonialism is inevitable (Judge 2004, pp.3948-3950). This is because the British perception of a stable and functioning society was one that was mono-religious. As such, the religious and culturally diverse India presented a number of problems for them as it could not fit into their societal mould. Mandair (2009, p.57) suggests British colonial machinery, such as their divide and rule strategy to be responsible for the creation of religious and caste identities as political categories within India. He also notes that communalism—meaning pledging allegiance to one's ethnic group as opposed to the wider community—is an essential part of Indian society and implies an eternal state of conflict between the different religious communities. This process not only consolidated political identities but also spilled over onto the self-perceptions of Indians. In addition, communalism during the British colonial period in India also affected the policies of the Indian National Congress as the British's divide and rule strategy continued to play a significant role in Indian society. These policies heavily relied on the colonial predilection for organising politics through communal identities which tapped into and manipulated self-identification of Indians for decades post-independence.

In conclusion, Sikh mobilisation into the Khalistan movement presents an interesting case study in understanding the coloniality matrix, as although Sikh nationalism was planted by the British colonial

powers, these sentiments remained in post-colonial Indian society. This case study is also of particular interest because it allows for a greater understanding of the post-colonial self-perceptions of Sikhs. In addition Arvind-pal Singh notes Punjab to be an ideal South Asian case study in assessing the role of a dominant European culture in shaping and transforming every aspect of life within society (Mandair 2009, p.119). As such, it is important that in our efforts to decolonise IR and in seeking alternative narratives to the pre-existing Euro-centric ones, that we question the role of colonial pasts and their continued effects in post-colonial states.

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A Theoretical Analysis of Identity in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Nigel Huckle

The colony of Rhodesia was a late hangover of White minority rule over a Black African population. The following essay argues that identity, particularly racial identity, played a major role in both the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence by White Prime Minister Ian Smith, and the beginnings of the ensuing Rhodesian Bush War that lead to the Republic of Zimbabwe. This essay explores race and identity in a theoretical framework—assessing White dominance and Black assertiveness in the case study—and parses through the historical developments that catalysed not one, but two African nationalist movements in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

It was a British colony that had gone rogue. From the 1890s when it was founded by the British South Africa Company as the colony of Rhodesia, to its self-governing status in 1923 as the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, to its unrecognised state of independence in 1965 as, simply, Rhodesia, before it finally became the Republic of Zimbabwe as it is known today, it serves as no surprise that this Southern African country was an epicentre for contested identity. As a colony settled by Anglo-Europeans, Rhodesia's decades of White minority rule presented a dilemma for the United Kingdom and the international community as a whole as it came to grips with the blowing winds of decolonisation, and catalysed not just one but two African nationalist campaigns in the 1960s and 70s. When then-Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith defied international pressure and issued the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965, the question of race was placed at the forefront of Rhodesia's/Zimbabwe's future, and the ensuing Rhodesian Bush War would decide that an African majority government would prevail. By analysing identity in a theoretical framework through the exploration of race in the colonisation of Africa, and discussing its place in Rhodesian

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[1]Please note, as recently discussed by Dr Kwame Anthony Appiah, Professor of philosophy and law at New York University, in his piece 'The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black' in The Atlantic, this essay will make use of capitalisation for both 'Black' and 'White' as they pertain to the topic of race, though both will be interchanged with 'African' and 'Anglo-European', respectively, for the purposes of this piece.

society and the corresponding international response, this essay will argue that identity played a major role in the 1965 UDI and the beginnings of the Rhodesian Bush War that followed, igniting the African nationalist movements of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

It is no secret that racial identity in particular, as will be explored in this essay, is a foremost matter of subject in the discussion of colonialism. From the very beginning of the colonialist era, White settlers came to assume themselves as more technologically-advanced than the African natives that they colonised through a lens of 'race science', whereby their superiority and dominance over their Black counterparts was seemingly confirmed by their corresponding stages of development (Alexandra 2020; Mudimbe 1988, p.60). From this assumption, and particularly in the case of Rhodesia, they went on to impose a European-inspired state economy in pursuit of commercial industry. Philosopher Frantz Fanon (1968, p.485) argued that colonialism existed to eradicate native Africans' pre-colonial way of life in the pursuit of instituting a 'better' system. This is further supported in more modern times by academic Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, p.17), who posited the ontological claim that colonialism was based on racial hierarchy. It is then easy to infer that a sense of supremacy in the White colonisers' attitudes, based significantly on race, guided the establishment and imposition of their own way of life in Rhodesia, particularly in spite of the less developed native opposition.

To understand the degree to which the Rhodesian state and society was structured on race, and the relationship between settler and native in this case, is to understand the need for an African nationalist movement. When responsible government (being the self-governing principle of a parliamentary Westminster-style democracy) was established in Southern Rhodesia in 1923, the first Government was entirely White. In essence, a minority Anglo-European institution was erected, and would hold dominion over a majority African population. In fact, the general historiographical argument on Southern Rhodesia is that the state was created to assert White dominance, as would be evident in policy, specifically in the eviction of Africans to outer reserve farming lands (Eriksen 2010, p.319). White farmers would be given private land, and the evicted Africans were then accessed as a pool for inexpensive labour (Eriksen 2010, p.320).

Clearly, the subversion of African way of life was taking its course. This can all be distilled and observed in the alarming horizontal inequalities that existed throughout this period in Rhodesia: obvious and glaring political inequality in that the Black population had virtually zero recognition or representation in government, and of course economic inequalities imposed by the state in the restriction of farming land access to the African population in favour of the White population. Based on what is known today about the likelihood for such inequalities to trigger violent conflict,

particularly inequalities of a political nature (Diprose & Ukiwo 2008), perhaps the Rhodesian Government could have made better inroads in their unsuccessful pursuit of racial partnership in the lead up to the Rhodesian Bush War.

The UDI was the quintessential display of Rhodesia's assertion of White minority dominance. With post-World War II decolonisation in its full swing, the White population lived with a sense of 'fear' that their comfortable lifestyle and rather strong economy would crumble in its wake (Good 1973, pp.17-18). As such, the social hierarchy in place in Rhodesia began to take its toll on the majority Black population, and the beginnings of an African nationalist movement began to take shape in the 1950s, particularly as Black Rhodesians gained access to tertiary education as the Government tried to appeal to the sensibilities of the international community (King 2001). The United Kingdom's decolonisation principle of 'no independence before majority rule' (NIBMAR) created a standstill in negotiations between the British Labour Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the Rhodesian Front Government under staunch conservative Prime Minister Ian Smith (Good 1973). The 1965 UDI would be the answer—albeit temporary—to the question of Rhodesia's identity: would it be ruled by a Black 95% majority or a White 5% minority (Good 1973)?

Such a display of raw dominance makes it no wonder that identity politics emerged as a catalyst for conflict. Not only had the Black population been subverted in social structures for decades, but the UDI had seemingly robbed them of the opportunity to amass political capital, and a violent conflict over material power was soon to ensue. What is interesting is that Prime Minister Smith (1965, speech, 11 Nov), in his address announcing independence, made a grand appeal that 'Rhodesia [had] not rejected the possibility of racial harmony in Africa.' But in fact, Smith's government had outright erased such possibility in repudiating the international community's standard of a Black government governing a Black population. Even the international sanctions that followed as a result were met with significant White intransigence. For this clear delineation and action based on race to have been invisible to the African population is a farcical hypothesis, and a nationalist movement should have appeared inevitable to the Rhodesian Government (Mtsi, Nykakudya & Barnes 2009, p.119). Thus, it is argued that UDI was the moment that Zimbabwean nationalism realigned its purpose from challenging the inequalities from within the existing system to the pursuit of violence for the establishment of a new system of majority Black racial rule (Pritchard 2018, p.274).

The insurgency of ZAPU, and its offshoot ZANU, would be the definitive push in asserting African, Zimbabwean majority rule in the creation of Zimbabwe as it is known today. In pre-UDI times, participation of Africans in the political system had reflected the social hierarchy, in that even a 'nonracialist' party like the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party had a literacy test that limited Black

participation (Pritchard 2018, pp.51-52). However, ZAPU was founded by Joshua Nkomo as a staunchly African nationalist movement in response to the Rhodesian Government's previous banning of two Black political parties (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2020). Irrational as violence and conflict often is, it is only rational to imagine such a militant political movement would result from the constant restriction on African Rhodesians' attempts to gain political representation. Furthermore, offshoot faction ZANU broke off from ZAPU in response to what they saw as limited movement from ZAPU's negotiation tactics in London, and Pritchard (2018, p.189) argues that this split was forged as a result of 'both factions seeking to identify themselves as more "Zimbabwean" and less "European", and drawing on a Black identity nationalism to achieve this goal.'

It is interesting to note the motto that came from these nationalist movements, particularly ZANU: mwana wevhu, which means 'child of the soil' (Mtisi, Nykakudya & Barnes 2009, pp.124-125). It was used invoke the values of nationalism not based on class, but on the importance of the allocation of citizenship (Mtisi, Nykakudya & Barnes 2009). It is easy to infer from such a position that identity as African was viewed through a primordialist lens, in that these nationalist movements saw 'African-ness' as absolutely inherent, and that it was an identity worth fighting for. Fanon (1968, p.492) argues that while there may be no commonality between two different national cultures—and in fact these two movements represented two different ethnic groups in Zimbabwe—there is commonality in their struggles against the same colonial oppressor. Though ZAPU and ZANU remained split through the ensuing Rhodesian Bush War, such a concept was certainly applicable in this case.

What is so intriguing to assess is where Ian Smith could have gone differently in the path he forged for Rhodesia. As conservatives often are, he was likely a detractor of 'identity politics' as a concept, as can be gleaned from his 'racial harmony' rhetoric in the face of international pressures to move to majority rule. Instead, Smith focused on the economic benefits that he claimed Rhodesia stood to gain from White minority rule (Mtisi, Nykakudya & Barnes 2009). But in fact, many defenders of politics on the basis of identity, like former Georgia House Minority Leader Stacey Abrams (2019) posit that casting a wider net based on class instead of gender or race ignores the disadvantages that those groups face in issues like pay, workplace treatment and in the absence of political representation.

To apply this argument to the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean case makes it uncomplicated to grasp the need for a racially identified nationalist movement in response. With the above in mind, it is true that race was not the only avenue for nationalism. In fact, it is contended that economic standing was another basis for the nationalist movements as the international sanctions began to take their toll; there was even the argument that Whites stood to benefit from the international recognition that a Black majority government would enjoy (Mtisi, Nykakudya & Barnes 2009). But in unpacking such an

argument, it is still plainly evident that race was at the forefront for change to a Zimbabwean republic.

In sum, it presents as no surprise that the issue of race is one of importance in the discussion of the era of decolonisation. The phenomenon of settler colonialism in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is particularly unique in that such a settler-native social structure and historical trajectory can only be contrasted on the continent with the likes of South Africa, and, to an extent, Liberia. This essay has presented evidence that identity, particularly in the framework of race, was a foremost factor in the evolution from White Rhodesian minority rule to Black African majority rule in Zimbabwe. Certainly, there were local, national and international factors in such an evolution: local discriminatory practices abounded in the apportionment of farmland and the economically-imposed social strata, the Rhodesian national government put its obstinacy on display in pushing the UDI to maintain its grasp on White minority rule, and the international community demonstrated its active dissent in the form of sanctions for Rhodesia's violation of the NIBMAR principle. All of these have the matter of identity, and notably race, at their heart.

For Ian Smith to have predicted an African nationalist movement to challenge his conservative Rhodesian Front Government should have been almost a surety, so when his army fought ZAPU and ZANU in the Rhodesian Bush War that was to follow, after a while they buckled and Smith was forced to concede to the insurgency. Because of this result, the Republic of Zimbabwe stands today in place of its oppressive colonial history. The issue of identity on the African continent is yet to be resolved, however. The diaspora of White Africans of European descent still remain throughout the continent. In fact, in 2014 Guy Scott, a White African, served as the Acting President of Zambia for a period of four months, the first White head of state on the continent since the end of apartheid in South Africa twenty years earlier. Scott's tenure ignited another discussion of identity and race on the continent. It is clear that scholarly debate on such topics could extend far into the future.

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Nigel Huckle is a second-year Master of International Relations student at the University of Melbourne. Born in Australia and raised in the United States, Nigel's professional background is as an actor with credits from across the globe including the international tours of *Les Misérables* and *West Side Story.* His passion for politics and government led him to the pursuit of his degree, with areas of interest in diplomacy and multilateralism.